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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction
The African girl child soldier finds herself in a precarious legal situation as this dissertation shall 
show. She is used as both a soldier in hostilities, as well as, a victim of sexual and domestic abuse. 
This dissertation will look at the law governing child soldiers and conduct a gender analysis to 
identify the specific needs of the African girl child soldier. My motivation for choosing this topic 
for my dissertation is that I sensed that international criminal law has yet responded effectively 
to the intersecting identities of the girl child soldier.  
2. Research Background and Questions
This dissertation aims to answer the question: does the international criminal law framework 
provide adequate protection to the African girl child soldier? The motivation for the choice of this 
question came about in my final year of LLB. I conducted research on crimes against humanity 
committed by Boko Haram, and found a lot of research had been conducted on the use of 
children in war. I became particularly interested in the use of girl child soldiers because of the 
disparity between them and their male counterparts - how they were used during conflicts and 
the definitions of child soldier in international statutes. The constant reference in international 
treaties of child soldiers as those who take part in ‘direct hostilities’, I felt excluded girl child 
soldiers from protection as girl child soldiers are often used as base-camp soldiers, spies and 
often times sexually, physically and emotionally abused.  
7  
  
3. Research methods  
The methodology of this dissertation is desk based. The first step is textual research of the 
experiences of girl child soldiers from the following African conflicts: Sierra Leone, Northern 
Uganda, Mozambique and Congo. These particular States were chosen because they are African 
conflict States and they also had data available on the position of girl child soldiers. An analysis 
of the activities of child soldiers in these regions will be in order to find out which set activities 
are common to girl child soldiers. The second step taken in the dissertation will consist of textual 
analysis of treaty law and definitions of the term ‘child soldier’. The third and final step will be to 
look at the international criminal law framework – analysing cases that have come before the 
International Criminal Court (hereafter ‘ICC’) and other international criminal law tribunals. The 
question that will be used to test the adequateness of the treaty law is: whether treaty law and 
the way it has been interpreted by the courts directly addresses the experiences of girl child 
soldiers?  
  
3.1 Gender Analysis  
In a paper by Abigail Leibig, it is reported that 20 to 30 per cent of child soldiers abducted from 
Northern Uganda are girls.1 The experiences of these girls are vastly different from those of their 
male counterparts. Leibig characterizes the role of girl child soldiers in hostilities as one that 
infuses both military elements and sexual abuse.2 When the girls turn 14 or 15, Leibig states that 
they are then treated as ‘wives’ often referred to as ‘ting tings’ and they are often sexually abused 
or given to specific soldiers as wives.3  
  
                                                     
1 A Leibig ‘Girl Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda: Do Current Legal Frameworks Offer Sufficient Protection’ (2005) 
6 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 1.  
2 Leibig at p8. 
3 Ibid at p7.  
8 
Rosen reports that child soldiers are frequently used to commit war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, particularly because commanders find it easier to manipulate children to commit more 
audacious crimes than it is to convince adults.3 There has been a rise in the participation of girl 
child soldiers in African conflicts of a margin of approximately 30 to 40 per cent.4 Here is a brief 
look at the experiences of girl child soldiers from different conflicts within the African continent: 
Between 1998 and 2003, the Democratic Republic of Congo (hereafter ‘DRC’) experienced its 
second civil war (the first being between 1996-1997).5 The pattern of using of child soldiers which 
had been established in the first civil war was also followed in the second, with different armed 
groups (including the national army) recruiting thousands of children.6 The child soldiers were 
conscripted in order to serve as ‘soldiers, porters and sex slaves’.7 It was reported that girls were 
‘primary targets’ for abduction and were often recruited for activities including use as sexual and 
domestic slaves.’8 Quénivet further reports that girls were often sent to be prostitutes in order 
to obtain information from enemy groups.10  
3 David M. Rosen Armies of the Young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism (2005) at p9.  
4 N Quénivet, ‘Girl Soldiers and Participation in Hostilities’ (2008) African Journal of international and Comparative 
Law 219 at p219.  
5 Sarah Kenyon Lischer ‘Chapter 9: War, Displacement, and the Recruitment of Child Soldiers in the Democratic 




8  S McKay & D Mazurana Where are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and 




In Mozambique, civil war started in the late 1970s and ended in 1992.9  It was between the Frente 
de Libertação de Moçambique (hereafter ‘FRELIMO’) and the Resistêcia Nacional Moçambicana  
(hereafter ‘RENAMO’) and because of the guerrilla war for independence in neighbouring 
Zimbabwe, the conflict had regional elements.10 Howana argues that the crisis in employment as 
well as the displacement of people caused by years of war left many young people eager to 
voluntarily join an armed group.11 In particular, some girls voluntarily joined armed groups under 
the impression that they would obtain power of some sort.12 Once part of the armed group, in 
addition to being trained to fight, girls often took part in domestic duties such as cooking and 
cleaning.13 Girls were often “married off” to members of the armed group as payment for that 
member’s good service.14  
  
In Sierra Leone, between 1992 and 1996 (a period which Mazurana characterizes as having the 
fiercest fighting), it is reported that the ‘majority of the camp members of the rebel Revolutionary 
United Front/ Armed Forces Revolutionary Council…were captive girls’.15 Approximately 80 per 
cent of the rebel forces were children between 7 and 14 years of age and 30 per cent of these 
were girl soldiers.18 Park stresses that the position of the girl child soldier was one where the 
                                                     
9 A Honwana Child Soldiers in Africa (2007) at p 7.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid at p9.  
12 Quénivet at p223. This is not a trend specific to the conflict in Mozambique, but was seen in other African 
conflicts: Sierra Leone, Uganda, Angola and Liberia.  
13 Quénivet at p233.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Mazurana at p107.  
 Ibid.  
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soldier was not only a victim of sexual abuse but also was the perpetrator of many war crimes 
themselves.16 Quénivet agrees with this analysis stating that ‘girl soldiers not only fought, mined 
for diamonds and fulfilled other duties for the armed groups, such as spying – as the boys did – 
but also cooked, cleaned and performed sexual services.’17 Qualitative research conducted in 
Sierra Leone found that the ‘wives’ in the Sierra Leonean conflict were girls between the ages of 
9 and 19.18   
Sexual violence is not a problem that only girl child soldiers face, some boys who are child soldiers 
often face sexual abuse. The problem of sexual violence, however, is more prominent within the 
group of girl child soldiers. This is illustrated by the characterization that Mazurana gives the 
situation in Uganda: ‘although most girls experienced sexual violence and the majority of boys 
                                                     
16 A. S. J Park ‘ ‘Other Inhumane Acts’: Forced Marriage, Girl Soldiers and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2006) 
15 Social and Legal Studies 3.   
17 Quénivet at p219.  




are used as fighters, some boys were forced into sexual servitude whereas some girls were 
frontline fighters.’19  
  
Park criticizes contemporary scholars for using the broad term child soldiers’ because it assumes 
that the experiences of boys and girls in combat are the same.20 The scholar expands on the 
experiences noted by Leibig, and states that one of the consequences of forced marriages of girl 
child soldiers is the pregnancies and child rearing.21  According to the qualitative research the  
‘wives’ in the Sierra Leonean conflict were girls between the ages of 9 and 19.25 Park goes on to 
say that as a result of these pregnancies practices such as unauthorised abortions, infanticide, 
deaths due to birth complications and gynaecological abnormalities due to pre-mature 
pregnancies, are on the rise.22 Park highlights the public health problems that girl child soldiers 
faced which are particular to them in contrast to boys.27  
  
                                                     
19 Mazurana at p109.  
20 Park at p321.  
21 Ibid at p322. 
25 Ibid. 
22 Park at p321.  
 Ibid.  
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It is due to the dual identities of girl child soldiers as fighters, perpetrators of crimes, as well as, 
victims of sexual and gender based violence, that this dissertation will adopt the term 
‘dichotomous identity’ to describe their experiences.  
  
Schedule of Work  
The dissertation will be divided into 6 chapters:  
Chapter 1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 International Legal Framework: Definitions and Terms  
Chapter 3 Problems with Definitions of Child Soldier  
Chapter 4 International Criminal Law Framework – Procedural Issues  
Chapter 5 International Criminal Law Framework – Substantive Issues Chapter 






CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK: DEFINITIONS AND TERMS  
1. Introduction  
This chapter will briefly give an account of the governing international law on the topic of child 
soldiers. It will give an outline of treaty law definitions of child soldier. The aim of this chapter is 
to serve as background that will constantly be referred to during the course of this dissertation.  
  
2. Definition of Child Soldier  
Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter ‘Convention’) defines ‘child’ as 
anyone under the age of 18.23 However, this is not an international standard that is adhered to 
when it comes to recruitment. Arguments can be put up for the age of 15 instead. According to 
Article 38(3) of the Convention any person under the age of 15 cannot be conscripted as they are 
considered a child.24 This minimum age requirement was re-iterated in the Article 4 (c) of the 
draft Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone which states that ‘the conscription or enlisting 
children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities’.25  
  
The Optional Protocol on the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict (hereafter ‘Optional Protocol’), echoes the age of 18 as the age of 
childhood and states that no one under the age of 18 shall take part in direct hostilities.26Article 
                                                     
23 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 1577 UNTS 3.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 2002 2178 UNTS 145.  
26 Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict 2002 UNTS 27531 
at Article 1. 32Ibid. 
 Ibid. 
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3 of Optional Protocol places an obligation on State parties to raise the age of voluntary 
recruitment to 18.32 Article 6(1) further states that State parties ‘shall take all necessary legal, 
administrative and other measures to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of 
the provisions of the present Protocol within its jurisdiction’.27 Article 8 of the Optional Protocol 
creates a efficiency framework requiring that each State party provide a report within two years 
of entry into the Protocol: ‘providing comprehensive information on the measures it has taken 
to implement the provisions of the Protocol, including the measures taken to implement the 
provisions on participation and recruitment’.28 After the initial report ‘each State Party shall 
include in the reports it submits to the Committee on the Rights of the Child…any further 
information with respect to the implementation of the Protocol. Other States Parties to the 
Protocol shall submit a report every five years.’29 The Optional Protocol has 163 signatories and 
of that number only 14 State parties have not ratified the Protocol.30 From the reading of Article 
1 of the Convention read with the provisions of the Optional Protocol, one would gather that a 
child is anyone under the age of 18, that there can be no recruitment of children under the age 
of 18 (whether compulsory or voluntary) and that States are obligated to ensure that these 
provisions are adhered to.   
The Optional Protocol could provide adequate protection for girl child soldiers as it has the higher 
age cap of 18 years old, it places a duty on States to provide periodic reports and it has an inbuilt 
monitoring system.31 The only problem is that of the 163 signatories only 14 have ratified38 the 
treaty which does not provide global coverage. In addition to this problem, it does not give 
assurance that the ones responsible for the crimes of recruiting children will be held individually 
accountable. 
27 Optional Protocol. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid at Article 8(2). 
30 Ibid.  




Like the Convention, but unlike the Optional Protocol, international humanitarian law imposes 
the age of 15 years as the minimum age for recruitment. Article 77 of the Additional Protocol to 
the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(hereafter ‘Protocol I’) states that parties shall take ‘feasible measures’ to ensure that children 
under the age of 15 do not take part in direct hostilities and that where children are between the 
ages of 15 and 18 parties to the conflict shall ‘endeavour to give priority to the oldest’.32 Protocol 
I relates to international conflicts. Its language is mirrored by the Convention. The Additional  
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (hereafter ‘Protocol II’) to the Geneva Convention which applies to non-
international conflicts, extends protection of children stating that children who have not reached 
the age of 15 ‘shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part 
in hostilities’.33 Protocol II extends the protection to include recruitment of children (language 
which is neither found in the Convention, nor in Protocol I).34 These Additional Protocols of the 
Geneva Convention are especially important when deciding what is considered to be a war crime. 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereafter ‘Rome Statute’) defines war 
crime as breaches of the Geneva Conventions.35 The differences in the wording mean that there 
is a different standard between children recruited in a conflict seen as international versus one 
that is seen as internal, as in the internal conflicts as Protocol II extends protection to recruitment 
and not only to use.  
 
  
                                                     
32 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts 1977 1125 UNTS 3.  
33 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts 1977 1125 UNTS 609, at Article 4(3)(c).  
34 Ibid.  
35 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 2187 UNTS 90/37 at Article 8. 
43 The Convention.  
 Ibid.  
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The Convention creates a framework that ensures that there is no compulsory conscription of 
children between the ages of 15 and 18.43 The tacit implication in this treaty being that voluntary 
conscription is allowed. This is problematic. The Convention is universally considered a success 
as it is highly subscribed to.36 The Convention echoes language of Protocol I. The practical issue 
that is often faced is that child soldiers join hostilities in a number of ways: some children are 
abducted and force into joining hostilities, however, others join voluntarily.37 Where children 
have joined voluntarily, especially if they are between the ages of 15 and 18 a complicated legal 
situation is caused in relation to Article 2 of the Convention – they are no longer protected as 
they have violated the ‘compulsory’ proviso in the Convention. Happold discusses the tension 
between the child’s autonomy interests and the need to protect children from participating in 
hostilities, citing that such participation is detrimental to the emotional, educational and social 
development of children.38 Happold argues that children under the age of 15 lack sufficient 
capacity to decide to participate in hostilities.39 A criticism of Happold is that he does not offer a 
reason for this assertion. However, it can be extrapolated from the context of his text that what 
was meant was that the age of 15 has become the minimum age for the capacity to take part in 
hostilities according to international customary law.   
 
  
Happold does not explicitly proffer a reason why a child of 15 years old has the capacity to decide 
to volunteer to join armed forces legally, instead of having the benchmark at 18years old – the 
Convention’s benchmark for childhood. Perhaps the answer can be found in international 
customary law. International customary law is constructed by a combination of State practice 
which is ‘virtually uniform’ and opinio juris (the belief that one is bound by a rule).40  International 
                                                     
36 Leibig at p4.  
37 Ibid at p25.  
38 M Happold ‘Child Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrators?’ (2008) 29 La Verne Law Review 56.  
39 Ibid at p71.  




customary law is binding on all States unless the State is a persistent objector of the particular 
rule.41 For a rule to become a part of international customary law, the first question is does State 
practice virtually uniform?42 And the second question to be asked is whether States believe their 
bound by the rule?51 The Convention and the sheer number of signatories and ratifications 
indicate that State practice is virtually uniform on this score. These actions by States is evidence 
that States believe that they are bound. There are 196 State parties to the Convention, of this 
only 2 have not ratified the Convention.43 The age of 15 can thus be argued to be the age after 
which children can voluntarily enter armed forces according to international customary law, as 
evidenced by the Convention.  
This argument can, nonetheless be contested. In a United Nations report written by Graça Machel 
(hereafter ‘the Machel Report’), she outlined the capacity argument and states that often 
children (under the age of 18) lack the capacity to understand the acts that are entailed when 
participating in hostilities and as such comes to the conclusion that there is no such thing as a 
child willingly participating in war.53 This is re-iterated by Rosen: children are often recruited 
because of their vulnerability and as a result are easily manipulated.44 Rosen then goes on to 
describe practices required for the recruitment of soldier to illustrate this: new recruits are forced 
to undertake acts of terror against family and friends including killing them – this is done in order 
                                                     
41 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America) 1986 ICJ Rep 14.  
42 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.  
43 The United States of America and Somalia have not ratified. Somalia cannot ratify at the moment because 
it currently does not have a recognized government. See The Convention. 53 G. Machel ‘Impact of Armed 
Conflict upon Children’ (1996) A/51/306/.  
44 D. M Rosen ‘Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law and the Globalization of Childhood’ (2007) 109 
American Anthropologist New Series 2.  
 Ibid.  
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to alienate them.45 These views echo those of the Secretary General in the draft Statute of Sierra 
Leone who advocated that children under the age of 18 engaged in hostilities should be 
considered as victims of war by the Special Court of Sierra Leone.46 This when read with the 
provisions of the Optional Protocol requiring that children be 18 years old57, provides a solid 
argument for the age of 18 to be the age where children are seen to possess the requisite capacity 
to decide to enter the armed forces. The tenuous position of child soldiers between the ages of 
15 and 18 is still an issue that has yet to be resolved in international law.   
  
                                                     
45 Rosen (2007) at p299.  
46 Draft Statute for the Special Court of Sierra Leone. Available from: 
<http://www.specialcourt.org/ document/s>. Accessed on 7 April 2016. 57 Optional Protocol at 




A critique of this position is that the law does not create a framework for how to deal with child 
soldiers who have been part of hostilities for a long time, for children who joined the armed 
conflict while under the age of 15 but have continued to be part of hostilities past the age of 15 
to 18. Are those child soldiers seen as culpable for any atrocities committed between the ages of 
15 and 18? The law is still unsettled in this area. The Sierra Leone Special Court did, however, 
circumvent this issue by stating that the purpose of international criminal law specifically was to 
prosecute the gravest offences and offenders.47 Article 26 of the Rome Statute excludes persons 
‘under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of the crime’ from being prosecuted 
by the International Criminal Court.48 However, child soldiers between the ages of 15 and 18 
would, nevertheless, not be immune to domestic prosecution.   
  
3. The Convention and the African girl child soldier  
This Convention has been described as one of the widest subscribed human rights instrument.49  
The only 2 States that have yet signed the Convention are Somalia and the United States of 
America.50  
  
Article 38(3) deals specifically with child soldiers; it states:   
‘States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of 
fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have 
attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, 
States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.’62  
In addition to Article 38(3) which seeks to protect the child soldier, the Convention also has other 
provisions which could be engaged in the protection of the girl child soldier in particular. More 
                                                     
47 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone at Article 1.  
48 Rome Statute.  
49 Leibig at p6.  





general provisions can be used to protect girl child soldiers: Article 2 of the Convention states 
that there may be no discrimination on the basis of gender, Article 16 disallows arbitrary or 
unlawful attacks on children’s honour or reputation, Article 32 prohibits economic exploitation 
of children, Article 34 further prohibits sexual exploitation and abuse of children and Article 35 
prohibits the abduction and trafficking of children.51 The meaning of the word ‘child’ under these 
more general provisions is to be interpreted using Article 1 which states that anyone under the 
age of 18 is to be considered a child for the purposes of the Convention.52 Therefore in using 
these provisions one side steps the 15 versus 18 year old debate, and a uniform standard of 18 
years old can be applied.  
  
 
Article 19 of the Convention places an obligation on State parties to protect children from mental, 
sexual abuse and create mechanisms to ensure such protection.53 Even though this provision can 
be praised for creating a duty for States to create a structural framework through which children 
can be protected (legislative, administrative, social and educational), it does not, however, 
protect children who have already been exposed to the abuse from the reactions of their 
communities.54 It could be argued that Article 27 cures the Convention of this shortcoming as it 
obliges State parties to recognize that a child has the right to a standard of living adequate for 
his/her moral and social development. Article 27(3) also places an obligation on State parties to 
take measures to help parents and guardians to achieve this; these measures include educational 
programmes.67 The strength of Article 27 is that it could be used to address the specific needs of 
girl child soldiers returning home and the problems they have assimilating back into their 
communities. State parties could, for example run workshops to educate local communities 
                                                     
51 The Convention.  
52 Ibid.  




affected by atrocities on how ideas of sexual purity may be detrimental to the wellbeing of a girl 
child returning from hostilities. The weakness of Article 27, nevertheless, overshadows this 
utopian view of how it could be implemented. The obligation placed on State parties according 
to Article 27 is the proviso that this is to be done ‘with national conditions and within their 
means’.55 The ‘conditions’ portion of the proviso could be used to argue the patriarchal character 
of a State party.   
An important shortcoming of these general gender provisions is that they disregard the 
fundamental problem that the girl child soldier presents to the legal system: her dichotomous 
identity as both victim of gender-orientated crime but also as trained fighters in conflicts and at 
times a perpetrator of gross crimes herself.  
Article 39 states that: 
‘States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological 
recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or 
abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an 
environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child.’56  
As one can see, Article 39 presents an answer to the problems that were mentioned with the use 
of Article 27(3). Article 39 places a direct obligation on State parties that does not have a proviso 
attached; it is couched in peremptory language such as ‘shall’.70 It focuses on re-integration of 
children into their communities and this is welcomed as mentioned in the sociological case 
studies, girl child soldiers are often shunned from their communities. It is still important to 
consider how international criminal framework deals with the problem that girl child soldiers 
present.   






4. International Crimes  
In as much as re-integration of child soldiers is important, the focus of this paper is to look at how 
international law in particular is offering solutions to the problem of girl child soldiers. 
International Criminal Law can be used a pre-emptory measure as opposed to the reactory 
solutions that Article 39 of the Convention provides. As put in the Machel Report, children under 
the age of 18 years old are recruited for their vulnerability and how easily they can be 
manipulated. 57  It is therefore important that the International Criminal Court and other 
international tribunals guard against the impunity of those in charge of recruiting and using child 
soldiers. It is the point of view of this paper that increased effective prosecutions of those 
responsible for the practice of recruitment and use of child soldiers could result in other potential 
recruiters being deterred from the practice.  
  
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereafter ‘Rome Statute’) establishes the 
International Criminal Court (hereafter ‘ICC’) and states that the ICC has jurisdiction over 
international crimes.58 Article 5 lists these crimes as: genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and the crime of aggression.59 Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are the 
core international crimes.60 Article 6 defines genocide as:  
‘means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:   
(a) Killing members of the group;   
(b)Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;   
(c)Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part;   
                                                     
57 Machel Report.  
58 Rome Statute at Article 5.  
59 Ibid.  
60 T.W Bennett & J Strug Introduction to International Law (2013) at p379-390. 




(d)Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  (e)Forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.’75 Article 7 defines crimes 
against humanity as:  
‘means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:   
(a)Murder;   
(b)Extermination;   
(c)Enslavement;   
(d)Deportation or forcible transfer of population;   
(e)Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law;   
(f)Torture;   
(g)Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;   
(h)Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are 
universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any 
act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;   
(i)Enforced disappearance of persons;   
(j)The crime of apartheid;   
(k)Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.’61  
  
Article 8 defines war crimes as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.62 Article 8(e)(iv) goes 
on to list the conscription or enlisting of children under the age of 15 years as a war crime.63 
Article 8(e)(iii) states that ‘committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy’ also constitutes war crimes.79 This particular international crime is important as it has 
the potential to capture all facets of the girl child soldier’s dichotomous identity. It is therefore 
important to look at the ICC and other international criminal law tribunals have dealt with the 
experiences encapsulated by the dichotomous identity.  
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4.1 Case Law from the ICC  
The following is a summary of how the ICC has responded to the question of child soldiers and 
how it could potentially respond to the question of girl child soldiers.  
  
In the case of Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo, the ICC decided that the recruitment of children under 
the age of 15 is to be considered as a war crime and therefore fell within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC to adjudicate.64 The facts of this case were briefly as follows: Lubanga Dyilo was the head of 
the Union of Congolese Patriots (known as ‘UPC’) and the commander of the organization’s 
military wing Forces patriotiques pour la libération du Congo (known as ‘FPLC’).65 Between 2002 
and 2003, FPLC took control of a town called Bunia and parts of Ituri.66 It was alleged that there 
was forced conscription of children (some under the age of 15).67 The children were taken to 
various training camps.68 The defences advanced were that Lubanga Dyilo did not recruit child 
soldiers himself (there was evidence to rebut this claim) and that some of the children under the 
age of 15 “voluntarily” joined the FPLC.69 The Prosecutor in his opening statement underlines the 
dichotomous identity of the girl child soldier stating that girls were trained to fight, used as spies 
as well as raped and used to perform domestic duties.70 The court found that because Lubanga 
Dyilo as president of UPC and commander of FPLC had effective control over operations in that 
area and therefore is found culpable for the war crime of conscription and recruitment of children 
under the age of 15.71  
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Even though the ruling in the Prosecutor v Dyilo case dealt with child soldiers as a whole, the ratio 
decidum of that case specifically excluded the experiences of girl child soldiers.72 The court has, 
nevertheless, dealt with gender related cases are useful in the potential plea of girl child soldiers.  
In the case of Prosecutor v Akayesu the trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal on 
Rwanda (hereafter ‘ICTR’) stated that instances of systematic rape are considered to be genocide 
and therefore an international crime.73  A brief summary of the facts is as follows: Akayesu was 
a former school teacher in and mayor of Taba commune.74 During the Rwandan genocide he was 
accused of allowing for systematic rapes and executions of Tutsi people and allegations were 
made that he provided the Hutu militia with death lists.75 The court in its examination of the facts 
especially pertaining to systematic rape found that Akayesu allowed for the rapes to take place 
and also in some cases facilitated them taking place.76   
  
  
The case of Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu, the Special Court of Sierra Leone found that 
forced marriage was akin to sexual slavery and is to be considered to be a crime against 
humanity.77 The findings of the Special Court hit closer to home in terms of the experiences of 
former girl child soldiers trying to re-integrate into society. As stated in the previously, it is 
common practice for returning girl child soldiers to be forced to go back to their ‘husbands’ which 
is a forced marriage in essence.78   
  
  
Finally, the case of Prosecutor v Bemba extended the liability for the crime of rape, to include the 
theory of ‘command responsibility’ whereby the commander can be found guilty for the crimes 
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(in this circumstance rape) committed by his troops during hostilities.79 These cases handed 
down by the ICC and ICTR are examples of universal ideals of human rights and international 
crimes being implemented and enforced in an African context. It could be argued that the reading 
of all of these cases in conjunction would provide adequate protection for the African girl child 
soldier as when read together they cover the intersecting traumas of participating in hostilities 
and the sexual abuse associated with of being a girl child soldier. The benefits and shortcomings 
of such a reading will be discussed and further analysed in the later part of this dissertation.  
  
  
5. Concluding remarks  
  
The issues identified in this chapter are: firstly, that there are differing legal opinions for the 
voluntary and compulsory recruitment of children. This issue is compounded by the differing 
frameworks presented by the Geneva Conventions, and the way in which they have differing 
standards are applied for child soldiers in internal and international conflict. The second issue is 
the uncertainty that exists for children under the age of 15 to 18 years old. It is unclear if they are 
protected as child soldiers under the law. The final issue is the dichotomous identity of girl child 
soldiers as both victims and perpetrators of crimes.  
  
The African girl child soldier finds herself susceptible to being victim of an array of international 
crimes – as seen in case law the perpetrators of systematic rape and forced marriages could be 
found guilty, and as demonstrated in treaty law her conscription if she is under the age of 15 
could lead to her recruiter being tried for war crimes. At first glance, it would seem that this could 
form adequate protection. The question, however, then becomes whether in practice the reading 
of all these different sources could lead to seamless protection of the girl child soldier. The 
following Chapter will critique the current definition of child soldier in international law. The 
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CHAPTER 3: PROBLEMS WITH THE DEFINITION OF CHILD SOLDIERS  
1. Introduction  
The use of child soldiers has grown increasingly through the ages.80 It has been reported that this 
is because of children’s relatively diminished psychological and emotional development which 
makes them vulnerable to manipulation.81 This part of the dissertation will look at definitions of 
a child soldier. It will do this by looking at the legal definitions of the term: child soldier. An 
analysis of the weaknesses of these definitions when applied to the girl child soldier will be 
undertaken. The concluding remarks of this chapter will underline why International Criminal Law 
is the ideal platform to challenge and broaden the definition of child soldier.  
  
2. Legal Definition of Child Soldier  
Park is wary of the use of the broad term child soldiers’ because it assumes that the experiences 
of boys and girls in combat are the same.82  From the brief look of sociological studies conducted 
within the above mentioned conflict zones, one can see a trend in the use of girl child soldiers – 
they are often used as sexual and domestic slaves, as well as in a myriad of direct and indirect 
combat (as spies).83 This will be referred to as a dichotomous identity.  
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The Cape Town Principles and Best Practices (hereafter ‘Cape Town Principles’) are a result of a 
symposium held between experts, the NGO Working Group on the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and UNICEF. 84  It was held with the aim of proposing solutions to prevent the 
recruitment of children in armed conflicts, demobilization and re-integration of affected children 
in Africa.85 The Cape Town Principles define child soldier as:   
‘any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed 
force in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and those 
accompanying such groups, other than purely as family members. It includes girls 
recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriages. It does not, therefore, only refer to a 
child who is carrying or has carried arms.’86  
This is an all-inclusive definition that covers the military activities that both girls and boys are 
connected with.87 The definition specifically references gender specific roles that are attributed 
to girl child soldiers such as acting as cooks, messengers, often used for sexual purposes and 
forced marriages. It also, importantly, protects adolescent children who have yet reached the age 
of 18 which reflects the realities of child soldiers on the ground. According to the Machel Report 
child soldiers comprise mainly of ‘adolescents, although many are 10 years of age or younger. 88  
The majority are boys, but a significant proportion overall are girls’.105  
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The Cape Town Principles were followed by the Paris Principles in 2007 which re-iterate the same 
inclusive definition of child soldiers.89 However, the problem with both sets of principles is that, 
even though they are recommendations made by experts in the field of child law, they have very 
little impact within international law. Binding international law is created through consensus 
between States, either through international customary law or treaties.90 These principles are 
thus persuasive, but non-binding. The definition that the two sets of principles recommend to be 
international law differ from what binding law actually is. These principles are important for the 
courts in particular as they offer persuasive legal opinions which could be used to justify the 
court’s decision.91  
  
Treaties are agreements between States and when signed and ratified become binding  
international law.92 The following are various treaties which contain definitions of child soldier. 
Article 8 (e)(vii) of the Rome Statute states that a war crime includes ‘conscripting or enlisting 
children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate 
actively in hostilities’.93 This particular age requirement is reflected in other international law 
instruments, such as the Convention and the Geneva Conventions.  
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Article 77 of the Geneva Additional Protocol on the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflict (hereafter ‘Protocol I’) places a duty on parties to take ‘all feasible measures in order that 
children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities’ and 
endeavour to give priority to the oldest in situations where the children are between the ages of 
15 and 18.94  
  
Article 4(3) of the Geneva Convention on Non-International Conflicts (hereafter ‘Protocol II’), 
places a broader definition on the activities of child soldiers and states that ‘children who have 
not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces…nor be 
allowed to take part in hostilities’.95 This definition protects children under the age of fifteen from 
being recruited in addition to ‘directly taking part in hostilities’ which is mentioned in Protocol I.  
  
Article 38 of the Convention re-iterates the wording of Protocol I, stating that no child under the 
age of fifteen shall directly take part in hostilities.96 It is important to note that there is tension 
between this provision and Article 1 of the Convention which defines a child as any person under 
the age of 18.114 The repercussions of this tension will be discussed as a weakness to the 
definition of child soldiers.   
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Article 1 of the Optional Protocol stipulates ‘State parties shall take all feasible measures to 
ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not 
take a direct part in hostilities’.97 Article 2 states that ‘State parties shall ensure that persons who 
have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.’98 This places an 
obligation on States to make sure that there is no recruitment of children (for the purposes of 
taking part in direct hostilities) into national armies.99 Article 3(1) puts it to States to raise the 
minimum age of recruitment above the standard imposed by the Rome Statute, the Geneva 
Protocols and the Convention as it states that voluntary recruitment into armed forces should be 
raised to the age of eighteen.100 Article 3(3) goes on to provide minimum safeguards to be applied 
for voluntary recruitment for children under the age of 18:  
‘(a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary;  
(b) Such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the person's parents or 
legal guardians;  
(c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such military service;  
(d) Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national military 
service.’119  
  
The Optional Protocol, nevertheless, stands alone in stating definitively that 18 years is the 
threshold for childhood and therefore recruiting of any person under this age is illegal. It is also 
unique in that it places specific restrictions on voluntary recruitment. However, the fact that the 
                                                     
97 Optional Protocol.  
98 Ibid.  
99 W Seneviratne, ‘International Legal Standards Applicable to Child Soldiers’ (2003) 15 Sri Lanka Journal of 
International Law 39 at p43.  
100 Optional Protocol. 
119 Ibid.  
33 
other international treaties so emphatically have provisions to the contrary not only causes 
confusion in the definition of child soldier101, but also begs the question of what the international 
customary rule on the matter is.   
International customary law is created where there is State practice that is ‘virtually uniform’ 
combined with opinio juris (the belief of the State that it is bound).102 State practice can be 
gauged by the treaties that States sign up to and ratify. International customary law is binding on 
all States unless the State is a persistent objector of the particular rule.103 The first question is 
does State practice virtually uniform? The Optional Protocol came to force in 2002 and has 165 
State parties that have ratified.104 The Convention is one of the most widely adhered to treaties 
with 196 State parties to the Convention, of this only 2 have not ratified the Convention.105 The 
provisions of the Geneva Protocols form international humanitarian law and are widely 
recognized as the rules of practice during war time.106 This trend could be described as behaviour 
that is virtually uniform by States. In addition, the fact that States generally recognize the Geneva 
Protocols (in particular) as the standard that they must act within during war time suggests the 
belief that they are bound by law126 – thus opinio juris is present. The prevailing international 
101 Quénivet at p222-233.  
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customary law rule would thus be the one reflected in the Convention and the Geneva Protocols 
which set the minimum age of recruitment at 15.  
 
African regional agreements set the age of 18 as the minimum age for recruitment. Article 2 of 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (hereafter ‘African Children’s Charter’) 
states that a child is any person under the age of 18.107 Article 22(2) references child soldiers in 
particular by obliging State parties to ‘take all necessary measures to ensure that no child shall 
take a direct part in hostilities and refrain, in particular, from recruiting any child’.108 Article 
22(2)’s reference to ‘any child’ with no specification of any age can (when taken within the 
context of the entire treaty) suggests that any person under the age of 18 shall not be recruited. 
This can be contrasted with Article 38 of the Convention which makes a specification for the age 
of 15, indicating that that section should be treated differently from the rest of the treaty which 
defines a child as anyone under the age of 18 years. The African Children’s Charter does, 
nevertheless, have the same reference to children taking a ‘direct part in hostilities’109 and does 
not give more information on what ‘direct part’ entails. On the face of it such language has the 
potential to exclude girl child soldiers entirely or with a looser interpretation include their combat 
and spying activities and exclude their experiences as sexual and domestic slaves.   
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3. Weaknesses in the definition  
This part of the dissertation will consider the weaknesses of the definition of ‘child soldier’, 
under the subheadings: Compromised Wording of Treaty Law, Treaty Reference to Direct 
Participation and Focus on National Armies.  
 
3.1 Compromised wording of treaty law  
Ann Sheppard points out that the first key weakness of Protocol I and Protocol II is within the 
wording of the Protocols.110 She states that the state of modern warfare is such that conflicts are 
‘predominantly internal’ in nature, meaning that Protocol I is seldom used.111 Taking for example 
the conflict zones referred in Chapter 2 – all of them (with the exception of Mozambique which 
had a regional element112) were civil conflicts therefore Protocol I would not apply to them.  
  
Sheppard goes on to criticize Protocol II because of the added constrictions that it places on itself  
- by virtue of Article 1(1) which sets out conditions to be satisfied before the provisions of the 
Protocol are engaged.113 These conditions include that the conflict must be within the territory 
of a signatory State, the State’s armed forces must be involved, the other forces must be under 
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‘responsible command’ as well as being capable of or exercising territorial control.134 The 
conditions mean that provisions of Protocol II only apply to State parties and rebel groups of a 
particular size and influence – this potentially leaves out smaller rebel groups who may be 
involved in recruiting children.  
  
The Convention is not immune to the trend of using compromised language which leads to 
incongruence within the text. This compromised wording is evident in the age range debate. 
Sheppard describes the drafting process of the Convention and how it involved the compromise 
between State sovereignty in the form of ‘military feasibility’ and humanity.114 It was noted that 
States found the age of eighteen would be difficult during times of conflict and thus opted for 
the compromise of the age of fifteen we see in the text.115 Sheppard asserts that Article 38 
contains ‘compromised wording’116, which she uses as an opportunity for a broader  
interpretation. Article 38 states:   
‘States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the 
age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons 
who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of 
eighteen years, States Parties shall endeavour to give priority to those who are 
oldest.’138  
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Sheppard argues that a liberal interpretation which protects children under the age of 18 is 
possible, especially when read with the provisions of the Optional Protocol.117 However, this is a 
tenuous argument. Even if the argument can be made that all children under the age of 18 are 
protected from being recruited, the clear wording of the Convention would suggest that 
adolescents between the ages of 15 and 18 are afforded significantly less protection than those 
under the age of 15.  
Sereviente severely criticizes the wording of the Convention stating that it is illogical for children 
between the ages of 15 and 18, who would be considered children for all intents and purposes 
under the Convention are allowed to be recruited and participate in armed conflict.118  The 
instability between the minimum ages of 15 and 18 have led to the practice of some States of  
trying to get parental consent in order to recruit children between the ages of 15 and 18.119 
Sheppard states that such consent does not erase the underlying legal problem that motivates 
the minimum age requirements to begin with, in that it still goes against the best interests of the 
child.120 A parent’s perception of the best interests of the child, according to Sheppard can be 
marred by several factors, including (but not limited to) the child joining an army to ease the 
entire family’s financial constraints.121 This illustrates some of the practical consequences that 
the compromised wording of the Convention has caused.  
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3.2 Treaty References to direct participation  
Sheppard recognizes the weakness of the specific reference to direct participation found in the 
international agreements. 122  Protocol I sanctions that children ‘do not take a direct part in 
hostilities’.123 Protocol II states that children should ‘neither be recruited nor allowed to take part 
in hostilities’.124 The Optional Protocol repeats the language that children ‘shall not take a direct 
part in hostilities’.125 The International Committee of the Red Cross (hereafter ‘ICRC’) states 
‘direct participation’ suggests that has three criteria:  
‘(1) A threshold regarding the harm likely to result from the act,   
(2) a relationship of direct causation between the act and the expected harm, and   
(3) a belligerent nexus between the act and the hostilities conducted between the parties to 
an armed conflict.’126  
  
 Sheppard correctly takes requirement (2) which requires that there be a direct causal link 
between the act and the harm as implicitly excluding other activities associated with warfare 
which include spying and transporting of arms. 127  Sheppard cites the Machel report which 
emphatically stresses that even children put in non-combative roles are at risk as well and are in 
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need of the same protection afforded to combatants.128 This is more so pertinent in the case of 
girl child soldiers who are often subject to non-combative roles.  
  
The Optional Protocol offers very little relief to this problem as Seneviratne points out Article 1(1) 
refers to direct hostilities which leaves room for children to participate in indirect hostilities.129 
This is an accurate critique of the Optional Protocol.   
  
3.3 Voluntary Recruitment  
The third weakness of the definition is the debate between voluntary and compulsory 
recruitment. Article 50 of the Geneva IV conventions states that States may not enlist children ‘in 
formations or organizations subordinate to it’.130 This has raised the question of whether children 
can themselves voluntarily join without being enlisted by the State. The Convention and the 
Geneva Protocols state that priority should be given to the eldest when recruiting children 
between the ages of 15 and 18 131  – which leaves room for voluntary recruitment of these 
children.  
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The Optional Protocol also creates the problem of compulsory versus voluntary recruitment of 
children under the age of 18. Article 2 of the Optional Protocol puts an age cap on State 
recruitment of children stating that there will be no compulsory recruitment of children under 
the age of 18.132 Article 3 when read in its entirety creates a system where it is feasible for 
children under the age of 18 to voluntarily join armed forces.133  Some States (as reported by 
Sheppard), have thus argued that voluntary recruitment is within the limits of international 
law.134   
An argument against voluntary recruitment of children will be made on two fronts. The first is 
based on the Machel report. Machel states that children under the age of 18 are easily 
manipulated and cannot be taken as having the capacity to voluntarily join the armed sources.135 
From a capacity perspective – children cannot volunteer to join armed forces because they lack 
capacity.  
The second front is related to the Machel report, in that I will look at children’s rights theory on 
autonomy. Sarah Kenyon Lischer outlines recruitment patterns or ‘causal paths’ of child 
recruitment in Congo.136 She begins by stating that displacement is one of the products of violent 
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conflict.137  There are three different pathways: the militarization path whereby there is the 
presence of militants amongst displaced communities and those militants recruit children.138 The 
second pathway is the insecurity path whereby there is an attack on displaced community camps 
and there is either abduction of children by attackers not allied with refugees or ‘defensive 
mobilization of refugees’ which leads to child recruitment.139 The third pathway is the insecurity 
over time pathway where the cycle starts with either an insecure camp which leaves for an 
‘opportunity for non-civilian activities in camps’ which leads to voluntary child recruitment, or 
protracted displacements leads to frustration amongst young people which leads to voluntary 
child recruitment.162   
Lischer doubts whether recruitment of child soldiers could ever be considered voluntary as 
circumstances cause the children to join armed groups.140 Piñero agrees with this deduction from 
a legal perspective stating that that child soldiers being considered as ‘consenting participants’ is 
contradictio in terminis.141 Piñero starts off by stating that consent comprises of three elements: 
competence, voluntariness and understanding.142 Competence speaks to when a child is seen to 
have entered the age of majority and have full legal capacity.143 Piñero looks at treaties including 
the Convention as well as the African Children’s Charter and comes to the conclusion that there 
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seems to be a general consensus that a child is any person under the age of 18.144 Therefore any 
person under the age of 18 lacks competence to voluntarily enter such an arrangement. In terms 
of the second element of voluntariness, Piñero reasons that the concept is rooted in the freedom 
to choose one of several options.145 The circumstances surrounding child recruitment, Piñero 
asserts, makes children often see joining armed groups as the ‘only real available choice’.146 
Piñero cites surrounding circumstances which lead to ‘voluntary’ recruitment; and these include 
displacement, homelessness, the children are victims of unpredictable attacks and sometimes 
the children are orphans. 147  The ‘voluntary choice’ to join armed forces is therefore a 
nonconsensual resolution.171 The final element of understanding is said to need the individual to 
have sufficient information and evidence from conflicts suggest that children often do not have 
this information before making the decision to join armed groups.148 This underlying reason is 
also used in the Machel report to revoke the idea of voluntary recruitment.149 It is therefore the 
opinion of this dissertation that a child under the age of 18 cannot volunteer to be part of an 
armed group.   
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3.4 Focus on national armed forces  
An additional weakness of the Convention that Seneviratne points out is that it only applies to 
State parties and non-State parties are not bound by these provisions.150 This is true of the other 
international agreements that have been considered thus far. The African Children’s Charter 
places the obligation on State Parties to take ‘necessary measures to ensure’ that there is no 
recruitment of children.151 The Optional Protocol does the same as it predominantly regulates 
activities of national armed forces and not those of dissident groups which is where we see a 
proliferation of the use of child soldiers.152 This is illustrated by Article 2 which states: ‘States 
Parties shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily 
recruited into their armed forces.’153 The problem with this is that as seen in the synopses of 
different African conflicts, often it is dissident groups that are involved in the recruitment of child 
soldiers.  
 
Protocol II could perhaps be looked towards to solve this issue as its focus is primarily non-
international conflicts. However, Article 1(1) of Protocol II sets conditions for the application of 
the provisions of the treaty and these include that the conflict is between a State party’s armed 
forces ‘and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
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command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations’.154 This has the potential of excluding smaller armed 
groups that do not have the required control over territory – leaving some recruited children 
outside the periphery of Protocol II. In terms of the conflicts considered in this dissertation, the 
Mozambican and Sierra Leonean conflicts would be excluded. This uneven protection of children 
is the reason why international criminal law must be considered as a way to remedy the 
weaknesses of international treaty law.  
  
4. How can International Criminal Law can provide adequate protection for girl child 
soldiers?  
The focus of most treaties is on State responsibility does not effectively curb the recruitment of 
child soldiers. As seen in the various examples of African conflicts, the recruitment child soldiers 
is often undertaken by rebel militia who may not necessarily be associated with the State. Placing 
duties and liabilities on States, though useful, does not truly address the perpetrators of these 
practices. International Criminal Law aims to curb this problem by placing criminal responsibilities 
in the individual themselves – meaning that the leaders of rebel groups responsible for the 
recruitment and abuse of children in armed groups can be called upon to adhere to international 
law or face liability for failing to.  
                                                     





Other options are available, but they are nevertheless, flawed. Seneviratne proposes that the key 
way to preventing the recruitment of child soldiers is for more States to sign up and ratify the  
Optional Protocol and other such instruments which make the minimum age for recruitment 
18.155 In the case of non-State actors and groups, Seneviratne proposes that they are dealt with 
at a domestic level.156 The problem with relying on domestic courts alone is illustrated by the way 
in which the issue of child soldiers was dealt with in Sierra Leone. During the peace process there 
was a push from the government and civil society in Sierra Leone for child soldiers who were 
responsible for committing atrocities to be held accountable for the crimes.157 Children between 
the ages of 15 and 18 were especially vulnerable to criminal prosecution themselves.182 The 
injustice of this is in the underlying rationale. A hypothetical example of a girl child soldier will be 
used to illustrate. As seen in the case of the DRC, many girls are victims of abduction.158 If a girl 
under the age of 15 is abducted, trained as a soldier and commits atrocities as they have been 
trained to do; should they be held solely accountable as perpetrators of war crimes after they 
turn 15 years old (taking into account that younger children may lack the requisite capacity to 
fully understand their actions184)? From a capacity perspective the answer would be no – surely 
the orchestrator of the crimes who fully understood or was capable of understanding the purpose 
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of recruiting the child soldiers within the conflict should be the one liable for war crimes. The use 
of the Rome Statute could prove useful because, unlike the Optional Protocol and other treaties, 
the crimes listed attach to individuals meaning that the responsibility is not just on State parties 
and is meant to bring to prosecute the gravest offences and offenders.159 In addition to this, 
Article 26 of the Rome Statute states that no person under the age of 18 years shall be prosecuted 
for international crimes.160 This would yield a more effective result as commanders of war are 
then deterred from using child soldiers as instruments of war.  
  
Webster accurately concedes that the Rome Statute re-enforces some of the inherent problems 
with treaty language through its reference to active participation and repeating the Geneva 
Protocols’ and Convention’s language that ‘conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 
fifteen’ is considered to be against the law.161 In this regard, the negotiated nature of the Rome 
Statute is one of its weaknesses.  However, the Preparatory Committee of the Rome Statute spell 
out the difference between ‘use’ and ‘participation’ by stating that:   
‘The words "using" and "participate" have been adopted in order to cover both direct 
participation in combat and also active participation in military activities linked to combat 
such as scouting, spying, sabotage and the use of children as decoys, couriers or at 
military checkpoints. It would not cover activities clearly unrelated to the hostilities such 
as food deliveries to an airbase or the use of domestic staff in an officer's married 
accommodation. However, use of children in a direct support function such as acting as 
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bearers to take supplies to the front line, or activities at the front line itself, would be 
included in the terminology.’162  
The definition of this terminology is part of the travaux préparatoires and therefore have a 
persuasive legal power attached to them.163 The explanation of why the Rome Statute used  
‘participation’, and departing from the language already seen in the Convention and the 
Additional Geneva Protocols I and II, is more suited to the experiences of war that girl child 
soldiers face. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the experiences of girl child soldiers 
differ from that of boy child soldiers as they not only take a direct part in hostilities, but are often 
used to take part indirectly in hostilities as spies and protectors of base camps.164 This stretch in 
the terminology used is therefore welcomed.   
However, it does not encapsulate entirely the issues girl child soldier faces – in particular being 
used as sex and domestic slaves. There are two potential resolutions to this problem. The first is 
using multiple provisions of the Rome Statute to try and cover all the experiences of girl child 
soldiers. The provisions of the Rome Statute could potentially cover the multi-faceted problem 
that the girl child soldier presents international law. Article 8(2)(e)(vi) states that war crime 
includes:  
‘Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in 
article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also 
162 Hermann von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, ‘Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court’,  in Roy S. Lee (ed) The 
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constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions’191 
This provision when read with Article 8(2)(e)(v) which prohibits the conscription of 
children into armed forces, the experiences of the girl child soldier would be justiciable.165  
  
The second and more preferred approach would be for the ICC to interpret the ‘use’ of child 
soldiers to include the rape, sexual and domestic violence that girls are privy to. This second 
approach would be preferred as girls would be included and their experiences validated as those 
of child soldiers. They would not have to rely on a patchwork of different provisions to try and 
explain in legal language what they truly are. Webster underscores that a key advantage to the 
Rome Statute which is the creation of the ICC which has the power to interpret the law and also 
has been an active organisation in terms of the criminalization of those responsible for the 
recruitment of child soldiers.166 It is for this reason that I conclude that the ICC is ideally placed 
to deal with the nuances attached to recruitment of the girl child soldier in particular. The test 
that is to be applied is whether the current treaty and customary law rules, as they have been 
applied protect the realities faced by girl child soldiers?  
  
5. Concluding Remarks  
This chapter has identified the main problems with the definition of child soldier. Many of these 
weaknesses are entrenched in treaty law and they include the compromised language of treaties 
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which leads to an imprecise age rule. It is still unclear whether only children under the age of 15 
are to be considered child soldiers or if the rule could extend to those under the age of 18. This 
issue directly affects the second weakness of voluntary recruitment. As shown in the argument 
made in this chapter, voluntary recruitment cannot be said to have taken place due to a lack of 
capacity and understanding often surrounding the recruitment of child soldiers.167   
  
The realities associated with child soldiers is vastly different from what the treaties subscribe. 
Firstly, the recurring reference to ‘direct participation’168 in many treaties is incongruent with the 
experiences and activities of girl child soldiers. Secondly the nature of treaty law which primarily 
focuses on the duties of States is out of touch with the civil and rebel nature of African conflicts.  
The mechanism created by the Rome Statute has the potential to cure these treaty ills. The Rome 
Statute places emphasis on ‘participation’ over ‘use’ which could encompass the activities of girl 
child soldiers as spies and guards of the base camps. The Rome Statute’s system of prosecution 
allows for the individual criminal liability of those most responsible for the crimes. Finally, the 
mechanism of the ICC allows for the interpretation of treaty law that is in line with the realities 
faced by child soldiers. A closer look into the international criminal law framework is needed to 
find out if it has any problems that could hinder the recognition of girl child soldiers’ dichotomous 
identity, or if it is flexible enough to provide adequate protection.  
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CHAPTER 4: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW FRAMEWORK – PROCEDURAL ISSUES  
  
1. Introduction  
  
International Criminal law is a relatively new advent of international law. Its key characteristic is 
that it attaches liability for the crime onto the individuals and not the State; as put in the Charles  
Taylor case the aim to bring to justice the highest ranking officials.169  
  
International criminal law cases can be heard in different tribunals, as well as, (more commonly) 
the ICC. The ICC has jurisdiction to hear cases involving the crimes of crimes against humanity, 
genocide, war crimes and crimes of aggression.170 In assessing the whether this mechanism of 
international criminal law adequately protects girl child soldiers, this Chapter will look at 
procedural rules of the criminal law tribunals. The key procedural rules and interpretation that 
will be examined will be the victims’ right to participate, their right to protective measures and 
the balance of victims’ rights with those of the accused.  
  
2. Definition of victim  
The court process usually begins after the conflict, or logically after the recruitment of child 
soldiers. One major way in which the girl child soldiers can participate in proceedings and make 
their experiences known and adjudicated on, is through being witnesses and victims for the case. 
Sociological studies conducted by Mazurana found that former girl child soldiers suffer from 
stigmatization from their communities when they return to their homes.171 The study conducted 
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in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique found that girl child soldiers were less likely 
to participate in re-integration programmes.172 This renders provisions such as Article 39 of the  
                                                     




Convention (which calls for ‘the social re-integration of child victims’173) potentially ineffective. 
The reality is many girls are ostracized after escaping from rebel groups – a reality which boy child 
soldiers do not face to such a large extent.  
  
As mentioned in the Introduction, girl child soldiers are often victims of rape, sexual assault and 
forced marriages to their commanders or other soldiers.174 In Mozambique, it was found that not 
only did girls constitute 40 per cent of the child soldier forces, but also that when the girls were 
reunited with their families, their families would often send them back to their ‘husbands’ or they 
were sent away from their communities.175  The same pattern was repeated in Sierra Leone.176 
In Sierra Leone the additional problem that was discovered during the re-integration and 
rehabilitation process, was that the former girl child soldiers would sneak back into their villages, 
in an attempt not to suffer any associated discrimination.177 The core issue in all these cases was 
that girls who were seen as having lost their ‘sexual purity’ were heavily criticized and 
stigmatized.178 Many of the girls had been prematurely pregnant and had suffered early child 
birth, abortions and exposure to sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/Aids.179 This has 
resulted in former girl child soldiers having increased psycho-social problems.207 It is with this 
background in mind that one begins to assess the adequacy of the protection that the 
International Criminal Law system provides.  
  
The system that the ICC has in place has the potential to lower stigmatization of girls in society. 
One way in which girl child soldiers access criminal court system is as witnesses and as victims. 
Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court (hereafter 
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‘Rules of Procedure’) defines victim as ‘natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’.180 The ICC in a dissenting judgment 
by Judge Blattman added detail to this definition by stating ‘a victim is someone who experienced 
personal harm, individually or collectively with others, directly or indirectly, in a variety of 
different ways such as physical or mental injury, emotional suffering or economic loss.’181 This 
definition was used in the Prosecutor v Lubanga Dyilo  in deciding who was a victim and who was 
not.182 When the definition given by Judge Blattman is read together with the Rules of Procedure, 
one sees that ‘victim’ can be interpreted widely. Girl child soldiers could easily fall into this 
category as those who have suffered harm directly. Garkawe has pointed out that the use of the 
word ‘harm’ in the definition is one that could possibly include ‘not only ‘primary’ victims (those 
directly harmed by the criminal act), but also ‘secondary’ victims (those psychologically or 
financially dependent on the primary victim)’.183 For our given legal issue, this would mean that 
girl child soldiers, together with their families and communities would be considered to be victims 
and thus could all be included in the court process. This would help alleviate levels of secrecy and 
stigma associated with girl child soldiers returning home – as all members of the society, and not 
just the girls as individuals, are seen as being affected by the use of girl child soldiers. The different 
perspective taken would further aid in rehabilitation after the conflict; rehabilitation would not 
180 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002. Available from: 
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181 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo(Decision on Victims’ Participation) 2008 01/06/06-1119 , Judge Blattman 
Separate and Dissenting.  
182 Prosecutor v Dyilo (2012) at para 16.  
183 S Garkawe, ‘Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three Major Issues’ (2003) 3 International 




solely be focused on the girl (which has the unintended effect of creating stigma and 
discrimination against her212) but it would be focused on the community as a whole.   
3. Overview: Victims’ Right to Participate  
  
The definition of victim is indeed wide, however, the Rome Statute does put a limit on which 
victims are afforded which rights. An example of this is participation rights which are only 
afforded to some victims. Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute states that:  
‘Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their 
views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings 
determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.’184  
This provision has the capacity to place victims at centre stage, giving them the right to participate 
in proceedings. Nevertheless, one must note the change in language from the use of the wider 
term ‘harm’ as seen in the Rules of Procedure, to the narrower qualifier requiring that ‘personal 
interests’ to be affected first before victims can participate. This shift in the wording of the Rome 
Statute against that in the Rules of Procedure, leaves it to the court to decide how victims are to 
be incorporated into the judicial process and which rights they are to be afforded. This could lead 
to uncertainty before the case is brought to court on who is to be considered a victim with 
participatory rights and who is not.  
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The ICC has been afforded the power by the Rome Statute to decide on grey areas in this part of 
the law.185 Therefore looking at how they have decided to interpret this provision in their case 
law would help alleviate some of the uncertainty. As seen in the paragraph above, Article 68(3) 
allows for victims with ‘personal interest’ in the matter to have their concerns heard, but with 
the proviso that the court decides whether this would be prejudicial to the rights of the 
accused.215 To avoid confusion as to when the hearing would be prejudicial to the accused and 
when it would not, the court has within their case history issued guidelines set by Judge Blattman.
  
These guidelines have been re-used and relied upon in cases such as the Prosecutor v Dyilo 
case186;  these include that there should be proof of identity which is to be obtained through a 
variety of sources including official and non-official documents.187 The participation of victims is 
to be in line with Rule 89(1) of the Rules of Procedure which provides that victims are to make a 
written application and such application is to be submitted to the Registrar who is to direct the 
application to the appropriate Chamber, as well as make a copy the submission to the Prosecutor 
and the defence.188 The Chamber is then to make a decision on who responds to the application 
within what time frame.189 This is a key guideline which led the court in the Prosecutor v Dyilo 
case to dismiss victims reports of girl child soldiers.190  The victim’s written applications and 
evidence was submitted in the later part of the trial and the court decided that even though the 
evidence was pertinent, admitting it into court would potentially violate the rights of accused.191 
The court uses the power that Article 68(3) bestows on it to determining at what stages victim’s 
statements can be considered without prejudice to the accused’s rights.192 However, one of the 
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guidelines set out by the Judge Blattman (which the court stated that they would follow) is that: 
‘Participation is to be decided on the basis of the evidence or issues under consideration at any 
particular stage in the proceedings and victims wishing to participate should set out in a discrete 
written application the nature and the detail of the proposed intervention’.193 By choosing to 
take a strict interpretation to Article 68(3) by deciding a cut-off time for victim submissions, the 
court implicitly sets aside this guideline put forward by Judge Blattman. The problem with the 
manner in which the court looked over this guideline is that it did not provide critical analysis as 
to why it chose a strict Article 68(3) reading over the guideline. It provides no reason why the 
other guidelines are to be followed, and why ‘at any particular stage’ is severed from its balance 
of rights.224  
 
It can be assumed that the balance towards the rights of the accused is what swayed this decision. 
Nevertheless, it is this lack of clear explanation of why this guideline is abandoned that it is to be 
asserted that the court took a superficial approach when assessing the question of girl child 
soldiers.  The problem of how best to balance the victims’ rights with those of the accused is one 
that is to be considered in a later part of the discussion. Nevertheless, for now it is important to 
note how the rights to participation of the victim are not absolute and the court can choose which 
stage acts as a cut-off point for the admission. The court’s reasoning was in view of fairness to 
the accused, but the consequence of this decision is that the plight of girl child soldiers in this 
case was discounted.  
  
3.1 Uncertainty over the standard of proof victims have to adhere to  
Other guidelines and their interpretation also have the potential to have a negative effect on girl 
child soldiers. Judge Blattman continues the list by stating that those applying to be identified as 
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victims need to show a link between the harm suffered and the crimes that the accused is charged 
with through a written application.194  
  
As a separate guideline states that in accordance with Article 68(3) victims have to show that 
‘their personal interests have been affected’ in a manner that does not prejudice the rights of the 
accused to receive fair and impartial trial.226 Here we see a resurgence of the terms ‘personal 
interests’ and ‘harm’ again. In this instance it is in the context of evidentiary burdens. It can be 
argued that the easier evidentiary threshold for victims to overcome would be to prove a link 
between harm they suffered and the crime that the accused is charge with. In this context 
families and communities affected could be a part of the proceedings as victims. The more 
difficult evidentiary burden to prove would be that the personal interests have been affected. 
Due to the fact the guideline and Article 68(3) both mention the ‘personal interests’ would give   
more force to this interpretation being adopted by the court. However, this is a question that the 
ICC has yet answered, meaning that there is still a level of uncertainty on who is considered a 
victim and who has the right to participate in proceedings.  
  
The uncertainty in the definition of a victim and the debate between the terminology of ‘harm’ 
and ‘personal interests’ affects the how the rights of the victims are interpreted. Examples of this 
are Rule 131(2) of the Rules of Procedure which provides that victims’ participation rights include 
the right to consult the record of proceedings (‘subject to any restrictions concerning 
confidentiality and the protection of national security information’) and ‘in principle’ victims have 
‘right to access and receive notification of all public filings and those confidential filings which 
concern them (as identified by the parties), insofar as this does not breach any protective 
                                                     




measures that are in place’.195 Rule 56 gives victims the right to call for reparations.196 Guidelines 
also provide that victims have rights to be granted protected measures. It is therefore imperative 
that the court decides on an interpretation of the definition of ‘victim’: is it to be taken as a 
person who suffers ‘harm’, or a person with ‘personal interests’? As it affects how we decide who 
has participatory rights as well as other rights conferred during the trial.  
  
4. Victims’ Protective Measures   
Rule 96 of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (hereafter ‘ICTR Rules’) ensures special 
protection for those victims of rape and other sexual crimes.197 It states that no corroboration of 
the victim’s testimony is to be required, and consent shall not be used as a defence if the victim 
has either ‘been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence, duress, 
detention or psychological oppression’ or it is ‘reasonably believed that if the victim did not 
submit another might be so subjected, threatened or put in fear.’230 Further the provision 
                                                     
195 Rules of Procedure.  
196 Ibid.  
197 International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2013). Available from:  
<http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/130410-rpe-en-fr_0.pdf >. Accessed on 14 June 2016. 
230 ICTR Rules.  
59 
explicitly states that prior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be admitted as evidence or 
defence.198  
The ICTR Rules provided protective measures which have been mirrored in the Rome Statute. In 
order to provide adequate protection, there need to be procedural elements in place that ensure 
that former girl child soldiers can approach tribunals and have their rights to privacy and dignity 
protected so as to prevent secondary victimisation. Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute tries to 
bring this aim to fruition stating:   
‘The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and 
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so 
doing, the Court shall have regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender as 
defined in article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and the nature of the crime, in 
particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence 
or violence against children. The Prosecutor shall take such measures particularly 
during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes. These measures shall 
not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial.’199  
On the surface, this provision seems to provide protection for the case of the girl child soldier. 
Analysis of the protective procedural measures offered to victims by Bedont praises Article 68 
for adding provisions to ensure gender protections. 200  Bedont recounts how prior to such 
provisions in the Rome Statute, the ‘lack of explicit mention of sexual violence crimes as grave 
breaches failed to give due recognition to the seriousness of the crimes.’ 201  Article 68 (1) 
recognizes the importance of protection of victims’ safety both physically and psychologically.235 
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The Prosecutor is also under the obligation to ensure that measures are taken to ensure such 
protection.202 It is important to note that this provision has the capacity to ensure the protection 
of girl child soldiers when they are part of court proceedings as victims and witnesses. However, 
this provision does have a downside which Bedont can be criticised for not mentioning: it is 
subject to the proviso that these measures of privacy and protection do not interfere with the 
balance of rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial.  
  
In practice, in the Prosecutor v Dyilo case victims were granted protective measures especially if 
they were in a vulnerable position; the ongoing conflict in the area meant that these protections 
were especially important.203 Out of 129 victims only 23 identities were disclosed.204 The court 
noted that ‘while the safety and security of victims is a central responsibility of the Court, their 
participation in the proceedings cannot be allowed to undermine the fundamental guarantee of 
a fair trial.205 This statement by the court mirrors Article 68(1) – it allows protections but tries to 
balance the rights of the accused. Other measures taken which tried to provide protective 
measures and balance these with the accused’s rights were: testimonies were often heard in 
private sessions, and allowing for redactions of sensitive information.206 The court would review 
what should be redacted and some of the redactions were lifted during the trial.207 In an attempt 
to grant the accused the right to question their accuser the court engaged  Articles 64(7) and 
67(1) of the Rome Statute which states that parties and participants are encouraged to 
thoroughly go through the transcripts of the closed-session testimonies. 208  The protective 
measures are therefore not absolute, they are (like the participation rights) limited by the rights 
of the accused.  
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There is a ‘tax’ that the court imposed for some of the protective measures it granted to the 
victims - the greater the extent and the significance of the proposed participation, the more likely 
it will be that the court will require the victim to identify himself or herself.209 The court tried to 
mitigate the blow of this statement by mentioning that ‘accordingly, when resolving a request 
for anonymity by a victim who has applied to participate, the Chamber will scrutinise carefully 
the precise circumstances and the potential prejudice to the parties and other participants’.210 It 
is clear that this is an attempt to ensure that accused’s right to be able to face their accuser is at 
play in this decision of how to weight anonymous evidence, however, the cost of this balance is 
unfairly paid by the victims. The use of closed sessions would have achieved the same or 
comparative balance of rights.  
  
The interpretation of the balance of rights by the court here, is very different to the approach of 
Rule 96 of the ICTR Rules which viewed evidence given with little information on the identity of 
the victims with the same level of severity. The question is then, does the way in which the court 
grants lesser significance to testimony given by those granted the protective measure of secrecy 
of identity, undermine the provisions of Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute? The simple answer to 
this would be yes. As mentioned above, girl child soldiers are often victims of war as well as rape 
and sexual violence – crimes which are often considered taboo in their communities and lead to 
their being ostracized.211 Rule 96 of the ICTR Rules clearly states that its intent is to protect 
victims of sexual violence. However, a balance so heavily inclined to the rights of accused mean 
that girl child soldier victims are less likely to participate for fear of their identity being found out, 
or in the alternative risk their testimonies not being weighed with the intensity that they may 
deserve if they choose to engage their rights to protective measures. This heavy compromise was 
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not necessary, stated in the recent Habré decision, victims’ testimonies must be dealt with dignity 
and all measures must be taken to avoid re-victimisation during the court process.212  
  
5. Balance between Rights of the Accused and Victims’ Rights  
Rule 96 of the ICTR Rules recognised that often the when sexual crimes are being prosecuted, the 
defence of consent is engaged. Rule 96 states that:    
‘Before evidence of the victim's consent is admitted, the accused shall satisfy the Trial 
Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant and credible’  
Provisions such as this can be praised for trying to cure the long-standing tradition of 
revictimisation of victims using the consent defence, nevertheless, it does put an additional 
burden of proof on the accused. McAsey argues that the ICC can be accused of taking a victim-
centric approach too, which severely impedes on the accused’s right to a fair and impartial 
trial.213 However as seen in the discussion of protective measures and how they have been 
interpreted by the court, this is not necessarily the case.  
  
Article 22 of the International Criminal Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia Statute (hereafter ‘ICTY 
Statute’) states that the tribunal is to provide protective measures for victims and witnesses 
which shall include ‘the conduct of in camera proceedings and he protection of the victim’s 
identity’.214 During the Prosecutor v Tadic case, the court offered total anonymity to four of the 
witnesses on the reasoning that the witnesses fears reprisals.249 As a result the accused and his 
lawyers were not allowed to know the identities of these witnesses.250 There were guidelines 
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including that the judges were allowed to observe the demeanour of the witnesses to test their 
reliability and they must be aware of their identity for the same reason.215 The defence was also 
allowed to submit any questions that it wanted to ask the witnesses.216 The majority of the court 
stated that there are five factors that the prosecution must prove in order for an order for total 
anonymity to be granted. These five factors are: presence of ‘real fear for safety of the witness’ 
or their family, the testimony of that particular witness must be important to the case, no ‘prima 
facie evidence that witness untrustworthy, lack of ‘an effective witness protection program, and 
the measures must be strictly necessary – where a less restrictive measure is available the latter 
should be applied.217   
  
In terms of the Rome Statute, Article 67 provides that the accused has the right to a public 
hearing, as well as the right to examine and question testimony against him or her.218 As seen in 
Article 68 measures already discussed, the Statute mentions that protective measures are not to 
be ‘prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial’.219 
The exception to this, is provided in incidences of crimes involving sexual violence victims or child 
victims.220 Article 68(2) states that  ‘as an exception to the principle of public hearings’ the court 
may take protective measures including in camera proceedings, in particular ‘in the case of a 
victim of sexual violence or a child who is a victim’.221 Rule 87(1) of the Rules of Procedure gives 
more information on the how the court is to do this. The Prosecution is to enter a motion for 
protective measures which is to be considered by the court after consultation with the Victims 
and Witnesses Unit.222 Unlike in the ICTY trials, total anonymity is not listed as measures that the 
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court can take.259 However, the name of the victim and any other identification can be expunged 
from public record, any participant to the proceedings can be prohibited from disclosing  
information to any third party, and the proceedings can be presented by electronic and other 
means.223  Garkawe argues that the framework of the Rome Statute read with the Rules of 
Procedure provide an adequate balance between the rights of the accused person and protective 
measures of the victims.224  
  
However, it is the argument of this dissertation that the balance between the rights of the victims 
and those of the accused is yet to be reached. This can be seen in the way in which the court 
deals with the issue of girl child soldiers in the Prosecutor v Dyilo225 case. Of the 129 child soldiers 
identified as victims in the case, 95 were boys and 34 were girls.226 Almost a third of child soldiers 
in this case were girls, nevertheless, the court focused on the testimony on one victim (hereafter 
‘P-0010’) as the lynch-pin for the experiences of all the girl child soldiers identified as victims.  
  
P-0010 testified that she was born in 1989, but was unaware of the month she was born and did 
not obtain a birth certificate.227 There were discrepancies with this testimony as the defence 
argued that P-0010’s birth certificate indicated that she was born in 1988 and electoral card gives 
the date 1986.228 To her defence, she explained that she had lied about her year of birth to the 
authorities in order to obtain the electoral card.229  P-0010 did not finish school as she was 
enlisted in UPC armed force.230 She was abducted when she was 13 years old.231 Other soldiers 
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(D-0005 and D-0006) say that P-0010 was born in 1985.232 The Chamber concluded that P-0010 
was an unreliable witness.233 Here we see the court grappling with issues of fair trial and  
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protective measures. Even though the name of the victim is not released, her age is contested 
heavily in court, allowing for the accused to put up a defence on the issue.  
Nevertheless, this balance leans more towards the accused’s rights. As illustrated through the 
testimony of P-0010 an important problem is determination the ages of child. The court in the 
Prosecutor v Dyilo case tried to identify the ages of the victims at the time of their recruitment 
using objective and subjective evidence.234 Subjective evidence were provided by the testimonies 
of the child soldiers, and the objective evidence was provided by civil status documents from the 
communities from which the children were born, doctor’s examinations and expert reports on 
the X-rays of the children’s bones and teeth.235 The court recognized that the objective evidence 
through X-rays and doctor’s examinations has been scientifically proven to not be accurate to the 
degree of accuracy required in this circumstance.236  The court was therefore forced to look 
primarily at civil status documents and look at the medical examinations as corroborative 
evidence as opposed to determinative.237  
Civil status documents, however, did not provide definitive proof of age. Evidence given by 
witness P-0046 in the Prosecutor v Dyilo case illustrates this. P-0046 was an expert witness who 
had conducted extensive research in the affected area and he or she testified that ‘identity cards 
and documents in the Congo are not very common. Very few people have official papers, in 
particular, children. P-0046 stated,  
“In fact, I never saw a child with an identity card in Ituri, so carrying out such a verification 
on the basis of administrative documents is not possible. So when you say independent 
verification, well, other than the information that the children gave regarding their 
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schooling, that was one way we had to have an idea and to perhaps reinforce the 
information stated by children”.238   
Investigations into the ages of children at different schools by examining the schools’ registries 
only revealed the age ranges of the children. This testimony is in line with P-0010’s, however, the 
court failed to point this out in its analysis.  
  
In addition to this the Prosecution put forward and the court took into account the psychological 
impact of the war on the children could have led to inconsistencies in the children’s 
testimonies.239 Even though the court stated that it would take into account, in its analysis of 
P0010’s testimony it did not consider that the psychological trauma of the war may have led to 
the mismatch of dates. It did not recognize the complexities of obtaining an identification 
document in Congo at the time. Instead, the court focused on getting precise information from a 
former girl child soldier, without considering the effects of psychological trauma. Other factors 
of her testimony such as the activities of girl child soldiers which other witnesses and evidence 
deemed to be true was not analysed to the great extent that age was. Given this information by 
the court it could be argued that that the court was too quick to dismiss the testimony of P-0010, 
especially given the pertinence of her testimony.   The court leaned more towards the protection 
of the rights of the accused and as a result ignored key considerations when weighing up the 
testimony of a girl child soldier.  
  
6. Prosecution and the Problem of Voluntary Recruitment  
The problem of voluntary recruitment has been canvassed in previous chapters. However, the 
ICC has given clarification of how it deals with two issues: the 15 versus 18-year-old age limit 
debate, and the voluntary recruitment debate. Article 38(3) of the Convention states that ‘State 
parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into 
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their armed forces.’240 It, nevertheless, leaves the door open for the recruitment of children 
between the ages of 15 and 18.241 Article 77 of Protocol I which relates to international conflicts 
places a duty on States to take ‘all feasible measures in order to that children who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities’.242 It also leaves the door 
open for children between the ages of 15 and 18 to take a ‘direct part in hostilities’, but States 
are to give priority to the oldest.243 Article 4(3)(c) of Protocol II which relates to armed conflict of 
a non-international character states that ‘children who have not attained the age of fifteen years 
shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities’.244 
Here one sees the different treaties imposing different wording for what children under the age 
of 15 are not allowed to do whether it be: ‘recruited’245and ‘take a direct part in hostilities’246. 
The repetition of the 15 years-old age limit and leaving the age group of 15 to 18 years old open 
has led to the interpretation that voluntary recruitment is possible for children who are between 
the ages of 15 to 18 years of age.247  
Article 8 of the Rome Statute takes a completely alternate approach and has worded war crime 
to include ‘conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or 
groups or using them to actively participate in hostilities’.248 The language of the Rome Statute 
veers away from the language used in other treaties and the reason why was revealed in the 
PreTrial and Trial Chambers of the Prosecutor v Dyilo case. In the Pre-trial Chamber I decision the 
court stated that ‘conscription is to be defined as forcible recruitment, whereas enlistment covers 
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241Ibid  at Article 38(3).  
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voluntary recruitment (although the child’s consent is not a valid defence).’249 This distinction is 
to be made on a case-by-case basis taking into account surrounding circumstances.250 The Trial 
Chamber accepted the adoption of this interpretation of the Rome Statute, and proceeded to 
prosecute the accused with help from this definition.288  The court endorsed the points of view 
of expert witnesses that ‘it will frequently be the case that girls and boys under the age of 15 will 
be unable to give genuine and informed consent when enlisting in an armed group or force’.251   
In this respect, we see the ICC steering away from debates on whether voluntary recruitment is 
possible and taking the perspective put forward in the Machel Report as it concludes that 
‘attributing voluntary enlistment in the armed forces to a child under the age of 15 years…is of 
questionable merit’.252 Therefore in terms of the ICC it is clear that voluntary enlistment or 
recruitment of children under the age of 15 is included as a war crime. What is left unanalysed 
by the court is what is to happen to children between the ages of 15 and 18. The court has also 
left unanalysed the question of why the age limit for child soldiers is 15 and not 18, given that 
the consensus in the Convention, the Optional Convention and other regional treaties such as 
the African Children’s Charter define a child as any person under the age of 18 years old.253  
Article 2 of the Optional Protocol states that there shall be no compulsory recruitment of children 
under the age of 18.254 For the voluntary recruitment of children between the ages of 15 and 18 
we are left with Article 3(3) of the Optional Protocol as it provides minimum safeguards to be 
applied for voluntary recruitment and this includes:   
‘(a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary; 
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(b) Such recruitment is carried out with informed consent of the person’s parents or legal 
guardians;  
(c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such military service;  
(d) Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national military 
service.’255  
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This provision provides greater protection to children between 15 and 18. The Convention and 
the Geneva Conventions requires that the State place priority on recruitment older children256, 
but does not require States to take the precautions that the Optional Protocol. The Optional 
Protocol does have a fatal flaw as it imposes these obligations on States and even makes mention 
of ‘national military service’ 257 . The past African conflicts that have been canvassed in the 
Literature Review, often involve the recruitment of child soldiers by rebel groups. These 
provisions put forward by the Optional Protocol would be useful in the DRC conflict where it was 
reported that the national army was also charged with the recruitment of child soldiers.258 It 
would, however, not have been useful in the conflicts of Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Northern 
Uganda as rebel groups were the primary recruiters of child soldiers.259 Thus there is a need to 
ensure the imputing of individual criminal responsibility to ensure that all military groups – 
(whether of national armies or rebel forces) adhere to the rules of not recruiting children into 
their armies. Hence the importance of the ICC as a body in interpreting the law and enforcing it.  
  
The question of children between the ages of 15 and 18 being voluntarily recruited has yet been 
tested by the court. It is yet to be seen what the court’s response to this will be, and how it will 
interpret the different legal sources on the issue of voluntary recruitment. For the case of 
Prosecutor v Dyilo the court did spend a great deal of time trying to assess the different ages of 
the victims and ensuring that they were under the age of 15 at the time they were recruited.260 
This suggests that age did play a role in the decision of the court, however the court has yet been 
called to task on voluntary recruitment of children between the ages of 15 and 18.  
  
Even though the Rome Statute is silent about the problem of voluntary recruitment of children 
between the ages of 15 and 18 and the ICC has yet been called to test the issue, the Rome Statute 
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does avoid the potential problem identified by the Special Court of Sierra Leone of prosecution 
of children under the age of 18 for liability for international crimes.261 Article 26 states that no 
person under of the age of 18 shall be prosecuted for crimes under the Rome Statute.262  
  
7. Bringing the Case to the ICC  
Of the 123 nations who have ratified the Rome Statute, Africa constitutes 34 parties to the 
treaty. 263 In 2016, South Africa began the process of withdrawal from the ICC. 264  A recent 
domestic case has since stopped this withdrawal.265However, the desire to withdraw was not 
isolated as countries such as Burundi have expressed the desire to withdraw from the 
Statute.266The move to withdraw from the ICC comes at a time where the African Union  
(hereafter ‘AU’) has severely criticised the court, citing the court’s history of prosecuting ‘only 
Africans’.267 The merits and demerits of the AU’s argument are not relevant to this dissertation, 
however, the problem posed by the mass withdrawal of African countries from the Rome Statute 
will make it difficult for jurisdiction to be founded for a case on girl child soldiers to be heard.   
  
Article 25 of the Rome Statute states that ‘a person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment’.268 Article 12 conditions 
jurisdiction of the court on the crime taking place in the territory of the State party, the crime is 
a national of the State party and the territorial or national State has accepted the jurisdiction of 
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the ICC.269 These are the more common ways of founding jurisdiction. However, it should be 
noted that the Rome Statute does make provision for the prosecution of individuals from Non-
State Parties where the crime was committed in the territory of a State part or in ‘a situation in 
which one or more of the crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor 
by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’.270 In the 
event of a mass withdrawal of African nations from the Rome Statute the Article 13 would have 
to be engaged over the easier Article 12. This means that founding jurisdiction for these crimes 
will become increasingly difficult.  
  
8. Concluding Remarks  
Who has the right to participate in proceedings directly causes some issues that the court has to 
tackle. An example of this is the determination of age by the court. In the situation such as the 
one in Congo during the Prosecutor v Dyilo case, where it is difficult to ascertain civil documents 
proving the ages of children, and neither medical nor schooling records are of much assistance271, 
it is imperative that the community is part of the judicial process. In such a situation it is the local 
community and immediate family members who would be aware of the accurate ages of the 
victims.   
  
The engagement of the community is nevertheless, impeded by the unanswered question of who 
is a victim – a person who suffers ‘harm’ or a person with ‘personal interest’? This critical question 
affects which rights are conferred on whom, procedural issues of who should file an application 
as a victim, as well as, what the evidentiary burden on the victim is – to prove a link with harm or 
with personal interest.  
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The balancing of the rights of the accused and those of the victims is often a complicated one in 
courts worldwide, however, how the court has interpreted it in the case of protective measures 
in the ICC is problematic especially for girl child soldiers. The court’s assertion that the revelation 
of identity may affect the impetus with which the court view testimonies is one that is 
problematic as it undermines the protective measures and their raison d’être of providing 
important safeguards for victims of crimes involving sexual violence or children. These two issues 
of uncertainty of who can participate and the problematic balancing of protective measures 
rights by the court provide major hurdles for girl child soldiers and their communities trying to 
access the international judicial system. It is important to go on and assess whether any 






















CHAPTER 5: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW FRAMEWORK – SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES  
  
1. Introduction  
  
The attachment of international crimes to specific individuals, as opposed to States is an 
innovation in international law and is sanctioned by Article 25 of the Rome Statute which states 
that ‘the court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons’ and is empowered to find the person 
‘criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
court’.272  
  
In looking at whether the court offers appropriate protection for girl child soldiers, one must look 
at the treaty law as provided for the Rome Statute and also how the ICC has interpreted the rules 
set out by the provisions of the Statute. The core crimes recognized in international criminal law 
are: crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes.273 These will be looked in turn. In order 
to decide whether the protection afforded is appropriate, this question will be answered: does 
the international criminal law case law’s interpretation of treaty law directly address the 
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2. The causation issue
Article 25(3) lists what needs to be done in order for a person to be considered criminally liable.312 
The list includes that the person has either: committed the crime (whether individually or jointly), 
orders the commission of the crime, ‘facilitating the commission of such a crime’, contributes to 
the commission of the crime with ‘a group of persons acting with a common purpose, or ‘in 
respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide’.274 This 
provision has been hailed for its broad nature which is able to facilitate for the prosecution of 
those liable for international crimes.275 It extends its reach to those who incite crimes and not 
necessarily commit them, as well as those who contribute to those crimes.276 This provision is an 
evolution of Article 6(c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (hereafter 
‘Nuremberg Tribunal’) which stated that the ‘leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices’ 
who were a part of the planning and execution of the crime should be held criminally 
responsible.277 The broadness of this provision is a positive for girl child soldiers because (as were 
the circumstances in the DRC during the Prosecutor v Dyilo case), the person being prosecuted 
for the international crime may not necessarily be the one who personally recruited the girls or 
the person who subjected them to domestic slavery and sexual abuse, however such a person 
may be responsible for the mechanism which allowed for these illegal activities to take place on 
a wide scale.  Welcome though this provision may be, it is often the first line of defence that is 
put up by the accused. It is the first substantive hurdle that any complainants (in this case the girl 
child soldiers) will have to overcome: they have to prove that the accused can be held criminally 
responsible in accordance with Article 25.  
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In the case of Prosecutor v Dyilo the defence argued that, firstly Lubanga Dyilo neither knew nor 
should have known that there were children under the age of 15 in the FPLC.278 Secondly, the 
accused ‘implemented measures prohibiting the recruitment of child soldiers and ensuring 
demobilisation’.318 Thirdly, that Mr Dyilo ‘de jure Commander-in-Chief of the FPLC’ and this does 
not mean that he had control over the recruitment of children, and therefore cannot be 
prosecuted under Article 25(3)(a).279 This defence put forward in a case primarily about the use 
of child soldiers, is a good example of the key arguments against individual criminal responsibility 
that can be put up. Commonly in any criminal trial the underlying elements of a crime that must 
always be present in order for liability to be attached are actus reus (the act of committing the 
crime) mens rea (the intention to commit the crime).280 However, Article 25 has expanded the 
ordinary meaning of these terms. The court came up with a formula to interpret the attachment 
of individual criminal responsibility for an international crime is to be judged. Criminal 
responsibility attaches to those who are found to have ‘control over the crime’.281 There are 3 
different elements: the objective, the subjective and the ‘control over the crime’ element.282  
  
According to the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, the objective 
element entails  ‘the existence of an agreement or common plan between two or more 
persons…and the plan must include an element of criminality, although it does not need to be 
specifically directed at the commission of the crime’, as well as, ‘a co-ordinated essential 
contribution by each co-perpetrator resulting in the realisation of the objective elements of the 
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crime’ (only those who ‘have the power to frustrate the commission of the crime by not 
performing their tasks – can be said to have joint control over the crime’).283  
  
For the subjective element the court states that one must look specifically at Article 30 Rome 
Statute which relates to the mental element; the court stated that intent and knowledge need to 
be present.324 Article 30(2) states that intent is to be construed as present where in relation to 
the conduct the ‘person means to engage’ in the illegal conduct, or ‘in relation to the 
consequence, that person means to case that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the 
ordinary course of events.’284 If intent is addressed in a cumulative fashion then there needs to 
exist a ‘volitional element’ (which encompasses three situations of dolus directus, dolus indirectus 
and  dolus eventualis).285 Article 86 of the Protocol I has a more stringent test  -  ‘the negligence 
must be so serious that it is tantamount to malicious intent’.286 This strict test could potentially 
cause additional problems when looking at the crime of genocide. Genocide is characterised by 
a special mental element known as dolus specialis where the accused must be proved to possess  
‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’.287  
  
The third and final element is control over the crime and this, according to the court is not limited 
to physically carrying out objective element.288  For this the court asks two key questions: does 
the accused have control over whether and how the offence is to be committed?289 Did the 
accused provide an essential contribution to the plan?290   
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These elements provide a useful guide in deciphering who bears criminal responsible. Due to the 
fact that international crimes are usually committed by a group or groups of people, it is difficult 
to prove the causation link between one individual and the crime. The elements that the 
Chamber offered in the Prosecutor v Dyilo291 Pre-Trial case are wide enough to infer a causation 
link. However, one lesson that can be learnt from the way in which this case was pleaded is that 
it would have been easier for the Prosecution to have used Article 28, instead of Article 25, in 
pleading criminal responsibility.292   
 
As previously mentioned Article 25 attaches criminal responsibility to natural persons.293 Article 
28(a) attaches criminal responsibility to the ‘military commander or person effectively acting as 
a military commander’.294 Criminal responsibility is present where such a person knew or ‘should 
have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes’, or in the 
alternative where the person ‘failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or 
her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation.’295  This measure works hand-in-hand with the Protocol I which 
places a duty on commanders to ‘prevent and, where necessary, suppress…breaches of the 
Conventions and [the] Protocol’.296 In addition to this duty, commanders are required to ‘ensure 
that members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations under the 
Conventions’.338  
  
Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute, when read with Article 87 of the Protocol I provides a crucial 
preventative measure, by placing duties on military commanders to adhere to the Geneva 
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Conventions and international humanitarian law as a whole. From this point of view, military 
criminal responsibility overcomes the causation problem. All the prosecution needs to prove is 
that the accused had military command of the forces that recruited girl child soldiers, for the 
duties stated in these treaties to apply. The onus then shifts to the accused to prove that he or 
she was not in command, or as put in Article 28 of the Rome Statute, had effective control over 
the forces.  
  
There is, nevertheless, a weakness within the duties prescribed by Protocol I. Article 87(2) sees 
that commanders ensure that members under their charge are aware of various rules of war that 
they must follow, but this duty is to be exercised ‘commensurate with [the commander’s] level 
of responsibility’.297 This limitation could easily be used as a credible defence and could be a 
portal for impunity when translated in international criminal law. It also, gives a hint to the pitfalls 
of the legal landscape – the less military power, a commander or the accused has, the less the 
responsibility and potential liability he or she will suffer. Vetter believes that this weakness has 
caused there to be a distinct difference in the way the ICC interpret military command 
responsibility and command responsibility of civilian superiors.298 A good example of a civilian 
superior is found in the case of Prosecutor v Akayesu.299 Akayesu, the accused, was the mayor of 
the Taba commune.300 He had exclusive power over the police, ‘was responsible for the execution 
of laws and regulations…also subject only to the prefect’s authority.’301 The accused was charged 
with and convicted with incitement to commit genocide.302 In particular the court had to decide 
whether systematic rape of Tutsi women was to be considered to be part of the definition of 
genocide.303 In terms of the dolus specialis of genocidal intent, the court looked at the ‘acts and 
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utterances’ of Akayesu.304 Instead of relying on the accused’s extensive executive capacities to 
create the causation link between the accused and the crime, the court sought actual evidence 
of ‘acts and utterances’ to show causation.305   
  
Vetter illustrates the differences in the way courts have a different standard for military 
commanders and civilians.306Protocol I requires that the commander either knew, should have 
known or should have reasonably known under the circumstances.307 Article 28(a) of the Rome 
Statute repeats this language in relation to military superiors.350  However, in Article 28(b) a 
different standard is applied to superiors of a non-military nature, stating that what is required 
is that:  
‘the superior knew or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated that 
the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes’.308  
One must note that the requirement when it comes to civilian mens rea changes to from the strict 
‘should have reasonably known’309 to a less stringent test that requires actual knowledge or 
‘conscious disregard’310. This distinction is important because, as illustrated in the Prosecutor v 
Akayesu311, the type of evidence proffered by the Prosecution in order to prove mens rea and 
later causation would necessarily have to be stronger in the case of a non-military accused 
person. In Prosecutor v Akayesu the court focused on the actual words of the accused to prove 
the presence of this mental element.312 The weakness with this differing standard is that other 
elements of the accused’s circumstances are not considered with the appropriate severity. For 
example, the court chose not to rely on the extensive executive powers that Akayesu had when 
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considering whether he was liable for the crime of genocide, opting to look instead at evidence 
of what he had said and done.313  
This has a direct impact on the protection that could potentially be offered to girl child soldiers. 
In cases where the person being tried by the ICC is a military commander all that needs to be 
asked is whether the person reasonably should have known about the crimes, and in addition did 
they educate their subordinates on international crimes. The responsibilities are less with 
nonmilitary superiors, regardless of their political power. As a result, advocates for the defence 
in cases such as Prosecutor v Dyilo, argue that the accused did not have effective military control 
of the forces regardless of the political control that they did have.314  This argument that, if 
successful, could undermine the very purpose of international criminal law which seeks to 
prevent the impunity of the ‘leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices’ of perpetrators of 
international crimes and not necessarily only the military commanders.315 Political leaders must 
be held to the same standards as military leaders, as in cases such as Prosecutor v Akayesu they 
can be revealed as being responsible for the crime and indeed inciting it.316  
All these elements need to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.317 It is important to note that 
this is a difficult evidentiary burden to bear, however, in the interests of balancing the rights of 
the accused with those of the victims, witnesses and overall prosecution. By laying out with great 
precision what is expected of the prosecution to prove in order to be successful in their claim.   
313 Prosecutor v Akayesu at para 728.  
314 Prosecutor v Dyilo (2012) at p32-33.  
315 Nuremberg Charter at Article 6(c).  
316 Prosecutor v Akayesu at para 733.  
317 Prosecutor v Dyilo (2012) at para 1357. 
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It is important to note that Article 26 excludes persons who were ‘under the age of 18 at the time 
of the alleged commission of a crime’. 318  This means that child soldiers are automatically 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the court.  
  
3. One Side of Dichotomous Identity: Prosecution for Sexual Violence Crimes  
Article 6 defines genocide as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group’ and including ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm 
to members of the group’.319  
  
The definition of this crime includes elements of sexual violence crimes which could apply to girl 
child soldiers. The court in Prosecutor v Akayesu inadvertently created a nexus between the crime 
of mass systematic rape and death of the victims.320 The court in obiter dictum of the case does 
note that the systematic rape of Tutsi women causes ‘serious bodily and mental harm’ and was 
often accompanied with the intent to destroy the Tutsi as an ethnic group.321 However, the court 
in its reasoning leading to the conviction of Akayesu cites the evidence that Akayesu was 
witnessed saying “tomorrow they will be killed” following a gang rape of Tutsi women, and the 
women were killed shortly after this incident.322 It can be conceded that it was in the nature of  
the particular conflict for those victims of rape to be subjected to death soon after – as stated in 
the evidence ‘many rapes were perpetrated near mass graves’.323 This suggesting the practice of 
raping and killing. The Rome Statute came about after the findings of this case. Now, Article 6 of 
the Rome Statute finds that the systematic rape or sexual violence geared towards a group of 
people is considered to be an act of genocide. This evolution in the definition of the crime of 
genocide, though admirable in taking into consideration sexual violence crimes, does not 
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appropriately address the issue of girl child soldiers. In contrast to the facts in the Prosecutor v 
Akayesu, the girls are raped, molested and are victims of sexual violence, as well as kept as 
captives and militarised. Therein is the key issue that the ICC presents for girl child soldiers – their 
dual identity as militarised personnel and victims of various gender crimes.  
  
Another core international crime is crimes against humanity.324 Article 7 defines crimes against 
humanity as acts that ‘when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’ and these include enslavement, 
deprivation of liberty, ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization’, ‘enforced disappearance’, as well as ‘other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.’368 
Girl child soldiers are subject to enslavement, imprisonment, ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization’, as well as, ‘other inhumane acts’.325 The 
definition of crimes against humanity fits more experiences of girl child soldiers than the crime 
of genocide did (as shown above). In a the fairly recent case of Prosecutor v Bemba Gombo, the 
court confirmed that rape is considered as part of crimes against humanity and liability can be 
attached to one who had effective control over the forces that conducted mass rape and 
pillaging.326 What the court did in this case was confirm that one need not be the one physically 
raping and pillaging in order to be held liable under international criminal law. According to the 
court, the accused not only ‘had direct knowledge of crimes’ that the forces, but also failed to 
investigate and prosecute the crimes committed by his troops.327 The court took a hard-line 
approach to the accused. Even though there was some evidence that the accused did react to 
the accusations that his troops had engaged in mass rape in ‘general [and] public warnings to his 
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troops’ the court found that this was not enough to satisfy the international standard.328 In the 
court’s words:   
‘The inadequacy of the minimal measures Mr Bemba took is aggravated by indications, as 
set out above, that they were not genuine, the manner in which such measures were 
executed, and the fact that only public allegations of crimes by MLC soldiers prompted 
any reaction, and then only to limited extent.’329  
This hard-line approach by the court enabled the court to find Bemba guilty of crimes against 
humanity including the mass rape of women by troops under his charge.374 This decision is 
welcome and could potentially lead to other generals enforcing disciplinary rules when and if 
soldiers conduct mass crimes. In this manner this case could provide a useful precedent. 
However, there are two main flaws with girl child soldiers relying on this plea. The first is that this 
case happened within the context of troops within a national army conducting atrocities. As 
mentioned in the previous section titled ‘The Causation Problem’, the Geneva Protocols place 
stricter guidelines on commanders of national militaries. Article 87(2) of Protocol I places a duty 
on the commander to ensure that troops in their charge are aware of the rules of conduct in a 
war and must take steps to enforce these rules.330 To a large extent, for the ICC, imputing criminal 
responsibility was possible because international law had already placed command responsibility 
duty on the accused. It is, however, yet to be seen if the same level of command responsibility 
will be interpreted to be required where rebel forces are involved. The recruitment of child 
soldier often happens with rebel militia as shown in the case of the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(hereafter ‘LRA’) in Uganda.331 A test case is needed to find out if the same level of command 
responsibility will be required of a rebel leader. As illustrated above in the previous section, 
stronger evidentiary burdens would be required, if the status of the accused is not military 
(national) or is civilian in nature.377  
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The second problem is that which was presented when looking at how genocide may help the 
plea of the girl child soldier. Akin to other pleas based on sexual violence, arguing that the use of 
girl child soldiers violates Article 7 of the Rome as it involves the rape and enslavement of girls, 
ignores the dichotomous identity of the girl child soldiers and only provides them with partial 
protection.  
  
4. Dichotomous Identity: War Crimes and the Importance of Prosecuting under the  
Appropriate International Crime  
  
Article 8 gives a list of the activities which are considered to be war crimes, and these include:  
‘(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy...enforced 
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of 
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions;  
[as well as] (vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed 
forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities’.332  
  
Girl child soldiers could potentially plead either one of these two activities which constitute war 
crimes. The first potential plea (Article 8(vi)) is the easier option for the girl child soldier to use. It 
is well documented that girls in military camps are usually used as sexual slaves and are raped.333 
In Uganda, the LRA has been recruiting child soldiers since 1991.380 UNICEF and the Ugandan 
government keep a registry of the children abducted, and it is documented that 20% of the 
abducted children were girls.334  These girls are used as servants and sex slaves.335  They are 
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susceptible to forced pregnancies and many have been infected with HIV.336 In 2000 the LRA  
released over a hundred ‘child mothers’ and their children .337 The leader of the LRA, Koney, is 
said to have sixty wives (which include some of the abducted girls).338 The criminal responsibility 
of the LRA leader is well documented and there is extensive evidence that rape, forced 
pregnancies and sexual slavery are a practice of the LRA and this fits in with Article 8(vi) definition 
of war crime.  
  
Even though it is good that the girl child soldiers do have a case that they can plead successfully 
under Article 8(vi) of the Rome Statute, the provision does not entirely solve the complexity of 
problems that a girl child soldier poses to the law. As mentioned in previous chapters, girl child 
soldiers are trained as soldiers and often used as such in conjunction with being abused.339 Girl 
child soldiers also form a substantial part of the armed forces – in Uganda girls formed 20% of 
those abducted, in the Democratic Republic of Congo of the 129 victims identified in the 
Prosecutor v Dyilo case 34 were girls and 95 were boys.340 These case studies illustrate that girls 
constitute a significant percentage of child soldier armies. For these two reasons, it is imperative 
that girl child soldiers are included.  
  
The key question when it comes to girl child soldiers is whether their activities are considered to 
be ‘active participation’. The Convention, the Geneva Protocols and the Optional Protocol refer 
to ‘direct participation’.341 A welcome change by the Rome Statute is replaces this phrase and 
states instead that armed groups are prohibited from ‘using [children under the age of 15 years] 
to participate actively in hostilities’.342 Also welcome was the court’s decision to engage in what 
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is meant by ‘participate actively’ from the Statute.343 The victims argued that active participation 
is to include related activities such as ‘scouting, spying, sabotage and the use of children as 
decoys, couriers or at military checkpoints, or to transport ammunition’.344  The Special Court of 
Sierra Leone case of  Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu which found that to ‘participate 
actively in the hostilities encompasses putting their lives directly at risk in combat….any labour 
or support that gives effect to, or helps maintain, operations in a conflict constitutes active 
participation’.345 This interpretation of ‘participate actively’ has the possibility of encompassing 
all the dichotomous identity experiences of girl child soldiers – it includes not only their military 
work, but also the labour that they provide for the camp.  
It is therefore unfortunate that the ICC in Prosecutor v Dyilo did not go further in looking at the 
question of sexual violence in the context of child soldiers, in order to provide complete and 
adequate protection to girl child soldiers. The court stated:  
‘[i]t is not necessary […] for the Chamber to engage in the critical question that otherwise 
arises in this application as to whether the ‘use’ of children for sexual purposes alone, and 
including forced marriage, can be regarded as conscription or enlistment into an armed force, 
or the use of that person to participate actively in the hostilities, in accordance with Article 
8(2)(b)(xxvi) and Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute. As just set out, the applicant has 
presented enough evidence to conclude, prima facie, that she was abducted in the broad 
context of the systematic conscription of children under the age of 15 into the military forces 
of the UPC’.346    
The girl child soldier was afforded a lower evidentiary burden here as she did not have to prove 
sexual violence, however the court did miss out on an opportunity to comment on whether 
sexual violence could be included the definition of child soldier.  This decision to veer from 
commenting on the issue, may have been a deliberate one as it had been contested during the 
trial. In the Pre-trial Chamber I decision, the court ‘excluded activities which are “manifestly 
without connection to the hostilities”, for instance by making deliveries or providing domestic 
343 Prosecutor v Dyilo (2012) at para 590-593. 
344 Ibid at para 593.  
345 Ibid at para 594.  
346 Prosecutor v Dyilo (2012)  at para 599.  
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help at the married officers’ quarters’.347 The Prosecution critiqued this finding by the Pre-trial 
Chamber citing that the court should:  
‘deliberately include any sexual acts perpetrated in particular against girls, within its 
understanding of “using”[children in hostilities] crime [and] that during war, the use of 
girl children in particular includes sexual violence’.348   
  
The key question in relation to the use of child soldiers becomes whether use is direct or indirect. 
Pre-Trial Chamber came to the conclusion that indirect use of child soldiers was to be excluded 
from the definition; which has the practical effect of excluding girl child soldiers.349 The Trial 
Chamber acknowledged that children engage in a range of different roles, but stated that it can 
only be decided whether these roles constitute ‘active participation’ only on a case-by-case 
basis.350 The court can be criticised for taking only a superficial response to the questions of 
sexual violence which were raised by the prosecution. The court dismissed the issue of sexual 
violence and enslavement citing that the prosecution failed to file these allegations at the 
‘relevant procedural stages… [and that considering these allegations] would cause unfairness to 
the accused if he was tried and convicted on this basis’.351 As canvassed before sexual violence 
and enslavement unfortunately is a common factor in the experiences of girl child soldiers. In 
failing to address all the experiences and dichotomous experiences of girl child soldiers, the ICC, 
has thus far, failed in providing them adequate protection.  
  
5. Concluding remarks  
As can be seen from above, the experiences of girl child soldiers can be encompassed by calling 
on different crimes. This is an option that the girl soldiers could employ. However, the key issue 
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is treating girl child soldiers not only as victims of war crimes or crimes against humanity, but 
making sure that they are included in the legal definition of a child soldier. Girls make up a 
significant part of armed forces, therefore their experiences should also be considered under the 
umbrella of child soldiers. According to scholars, girls are used as military personnel, undergo 
military training and are used frequently used as spies.399 Their experiences (though similar) are 
very different to those of rape and slavery victims.   
The way in which the crime is pleaded and framed has a direct impact on the rehabilitation orders 
that the court can suggest. This is why it is so important that the legal definition of child soldiers 
reflects the experiences of all children involved and not just the experiences of boys.  
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CHAPTER 6: FINAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS  
  
1. Analysis  
The question that this dissertation aimed to answer is: does the international criminal law 
framework provided adequate protection to the African girl child soldier? The test that was 
applied throughout the paper was whether the international criminal law framework directly 
addresses the experiences of the girl child soldier. The answer to this is, no it does not yet address 
the experiences of the girl child soldier and therefore does not yet provide adequate protection.  
It does, nevertheless, retain the potential to do so.  
  
The reasons for this answer can be traced back to the methodology taken in this dissertation. 
Firstly, the experiences of girl child soldiers who were a part of different African conflicts were 
discussed to find out if there were common experiences that existed for all of them. There were. 
As discussed in the earlier chapters, girl child soldiers were often trained militarily and used as 
spies, protectors of the base camp and at times as fighters themselves. 352  However, a key 
difference between them and boy child soldiers is that the girls were predominantly the victims 
of sexual and domestic abuses – often being given to commanders as wives.353 The dual nature 
of these experiences led to the term ‘dichotomous identity’ being used throughout this paper to 
try and encapsulate the duality that the problem of girl child soldiers presents.  
  
After the discussion to find the common denominators and the discovery of their dichotomous 
identity, the dissertation went on to interrogate the definition of a child soldier according to 
numerous international law sources. It was found that treaties such as the Convention and the  
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Geneva Protocols defined child soldier as ‘any person under the age fifteen’354, despite defining 
a child as ‘any person under the age of eighteen’355.  Through the treaty analysis other key issues 
were identified that negatively affect the protection of girl child soldiers. The first issue identified 
was the compromised wording of treaty law which led to the Convention’s setting of a different 
age for recruitment.356 The second issue was the treaty references to ‘direct participation’ which 
when interpreted strictly would exclude the experiences of girl child soldiers who often take part 
indirectly during armed conflict. The third being the logical difficulties with the concept of 
voluntary recruitment and finally the focus on national militaries.  
  
Some of these problems are fixed by the Rome Statute and international criminal law. An 
overarching problem with the treaty system and international customary law is that it requires 
consensus from State.357 The focus then naturally becomes on imposing duties on States and 
national military commanders to note break rules of international law. In an African conflict 
context, it was found that placing obligations solely on the State could lead to inadequate 
protection as several of the conflicts mentioned were non-international – between rebel groups 
which were not necessarily affiliated with the State358. The solution which international criminal 
law provides is that it places individual criminal responsibility on those considered to be most 
responsible for the crimes, regardless of their place (or lack thereof) in the State. 359  The 
establishment of the ICC also has the benefit of interpreting international law in keeping with the 
realities of warfare; the use of girl child soldiers being one such reality that could gain from 
interpretation from the court.  
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A close interrogation of the Rules of Procedure, the Rome Statute and decisions of the ICC found 
that the international criminal law framework is not without its flaws. The Rules of Procedure 
and how they are applied provide an ambiguous landscape for victims to navigate through. It is 
unclear which victims are afforded rights of participation and of protection as the court has 
neglected to clarify whether it is ‘harm’ or ‘personal interests’ that one has to prove. The nature 
of the court is also such that it answers questions on a case-by-case basis360 therefore issues such 
as that of voluntary recruitment of children between the ages of 15 and 18 are still left 
unanswered. And finally, the proposed mass withdrawal of African States from the Rome Statute 
threatens to make the bringing of a claim to the ICC even more difficult.  
  
Substantively, the ICC’s definition of the core crimes has the capacity to tackle most of the 
experiences of the girl child soldier. All three core crimes are defined to include sexual violence 
crimes. 361  However, the problem is that these crimes deal in part with the girl child’s 
dichotomous identity, and leave out a key part – she is a child soldier. Article 8 of the Rome 
Statute provides a simple solution to this. Its wording varies from previous treaties as it 
references active participation, rather than ‘direct participation’.362 The ICC, however veered 
away from the problem of girl child soldiers when the question was posed to the court, even 
though there was evidence to support the claim of girl child soldiers.363 This approach has left us 
with two possible interpretations which have not been confirmed at Trial Chamber level: 
Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu perspective which defines active participation based on 
the risk involved in the child’s activities and includes gender specific work which could fulfil the 
dichotomous identity, and a more stringent Pre-Trial Chamber interpretation which explicitly 
excludes sexual violence of girls from the definition of child soldier.364 The court in the Prosecutor 
v Dyilo case did not engage with the question of which approach to take.413 It is therefore yet to 
                                                     
360 Prosecutor v Dyilo (2012) at para 16.  
361 See Rome Statute at Article 7,8,9.  
362 Rome Statute at Article 8.  
363 Prosecutor v Dyilo (2012) at para 76.  
364 Ibid. Also see Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu at para 736-737. 
413 Ibid at para 599.  
94 
be seen whether the interpretation of the court will lead to greater protection of girl child 
soldiers.  
2. Conclusion
In conclusion, the ICC and the International Criminal Law framework does provide opportunity 
for cases such as that of the African girl child soldier to be heard and interpreted into criminal 
law. It does have the potential to include the dichotomous identity and experiences of girl child 
soldiers into the definition of girl child soldier. However, as of yet the ICC has steered away from 
this challenge. The only confirmed interpretations of the Rome Statute by the ICC involve sexual 
violence as international crimes and would only speak to some and not all of the experiences of 
the girl child soldier. There have been interpretations of child soldier in tribunals 365 and within 
persuasive international documents366 which would include looking at the risk the child is placed 
in, and include activities such as spying. These interpretations could help provide adequate 
protection. However, the ICC has veered away from these interpretations and from addressing 
the dichotomous identity of girl child soldiers.367 It is important to correctly classify the girl child 
soldier as what she is – a child soldier; and with her activities and experiences not being 
recognised as being those of a child soldier, she is in danger of remaining in the fringes of the 
law. As such the International Criminal Law framework does not provide adequate protection of 
the African girl child soldier.  
365 Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara and Kanu at para 736-737. 
366 Cape Town Principles at p2-3.  
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